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ABSTRACT
Very fundamental primitives in cryptographic protocols are commitment schemes
and zero-knowledge proofs that are frequently employed in real-world applica-
tions. A commitment scheme enables a committer to compute a commitment
to a secret message, and later open it (i.e, expose the secret message) in a ver-
ifiable manner. Universally composable (UC) commitment schemes are of par-
ticular interest, as one can seamlessly combine them with other UC protocols
and primitives while the entire protocol remains secure. Moreover, efficient UC-
secure commitments significantly enable more efficient constructions of proto-
cols for some applications like as two-party computation in garbled circuits, zero-
knowledge proofs, and multiparty computation. However, uniting universal com-
posability and commitment schemes often needs to scarify efficiency.
A zero-knowledge proof is a protocol between a prover and a verifier that al-
lows the prover to convince the verifier of the validity of a statement without
disclosing any more additional information. Zero-knowledge proofs and in par-
ticular non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) are a critical primitive for
building cryptographic protocols. They allow ensuring the correctness of some
computations while valuing preserving the privacy of the user. NIZKs are get-
ting increasingly used in real-world applications, with cryptocurrencies or more
generally distributed ledger technologies being the prime examples. Thus it is de-
sirable and crucial that NIZKs have fast verification and small proof sizes. Due to
the specifics in this setting, succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (so-
called zk-SNARKs) are of particular interest and research in this direction within
academia and industry is currently erupting. Besides, recently there has been a
research line of another type of NIZKs for a linear language called quasi adaptive
NIZK (QA-NIZK). These constructions of NIZKs also provide succinctness (hav-
ing fast verification and small proof sizes) and together with SNARKs perceiving
are getting a lot of consideration in the real world cryptographic protocols.
A serious issue and the main drawback of the practical usage of NIZKs is the
demand for a trusted setup for generating the common reference string (CRS).
In this line there are two significant practical outlines to diminish the trust in
the setup procedure: (i) using the new notion of security called subversion zero-
knowledge initiated by Bellare et al. in [22], where the zero-knowledge property
even remains when the CRS is generated maliciously, i.e., the CRS generator is
subverted, and (ii) utilizing multi-party computation (MPC) to generate the CRS.
In the latter case, the UC-security property is crucial, to securely compose the
CRS generation protocol with the NIZK (zk-SNARK or QA-NIZK) in a black-
box way (with warranting the security of the NIZK).
In this thesis, we investigate the aforementioned outlines and propose con-
crete constructions for them. We first investigate subversion zk-SNARKs (Sub-
zk-SNARKs), in particular, constructing subversion of the most efficient SNARKs
of [94]. Then we initiate the study of subversion QA-NIZK (Sub-QA-NIZK) and
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construct subversion resistant version of the most efficient QA-NIZKs of [106].
For the second outline, first using hash proof systems or smooth projective hash
functions (SPHFs), we introduce a new cryptographic primitive called publicly
computable SPHFs (PC-SPHFs) and construct the currently most efficient non-
interactive UC-secure commitment. Finally, we develop a new technique for con-
structing UC-secure commitments schemes that enables one to generate CRS of
NIZKs by using MPC in a UC-secure manner.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main goal of cryptography for a long time was to allow two parties who
agreed on a secret value (i.e., secret key) to communicate confidentially by us-
ing encryption and commitment schemes. Since the introduction of key exchange
[69], public-key encryption and digital signatures [128], the extent of cryptog-
raphy has vastly been broadened. The public key encryption and key exchange
enable a sender to make a confidential communication, without knowing the re-
ceiver. Digital signatures guarantee that a message belongs to a valid entity or a
valid user. While commitment schemes ensure that the committed message will
not change during the protocol.
These days, cryptography is prevalent in our daily life, even sometimes in hid-
den forms such as access badges emails, credit cards and smartphones which all
use cryptographic protocols. Also, the field of cryptography has been broadened
by containing more practical primitives and cryptographic protocols such as zero-
knowledge proofs, introduced by Goldwasser et al. [86]. A zero-knowledge proof
is a protocol between a prover and a verifier that allows the prover to convince
the verifier of the validity of a statement without revealing any more information.
Zero-knowledge proofs and in particular non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
(NIZKs) are an important primitive for cryptographic protocols, by which you can
ensure both the correctness of computation and the user privacy at the same time.
Practically they were first employed in electronic voting systems1. Later they
played a central role in both the practice and theory of cryptography and increas-
ingly found their way into real-world applications.2,3,4 Some important applica-
tions are anonymous credentials [21,46–49,55,78], electronic voting [63,93,129],
and group signatures [18, 36, 37, 56, 66–68], including widely deployed schemes
such as direct anonymous attestation (DAA) [40,45] employed in Intel’s Enhanced
Privacy ID (EPID) [41] or the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), as well as many
other applications that need integrity and balancing privacy (cf. [75]). In addition
they are a core of verifiable computation [38, 81, 82, 126] and increasingly more
popular in privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies [25, 57], self-sovereign identity
systems [123], and smart contracts [108]. Latter arguably, nowadays represent the
most popular real-world applications of zero-knowledge, where it uses in systems
such as Zcash and Ethereum. Due to aforementioned applications, a long line
of research [82, 92, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 106, 113] has led to efficient zero-
knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs)
1Helios Voting cf. https://vote.heliosvoting.org.
2ZKProof (https://zkproof.org/) being the most notable industry and academic initiative
towards a common framework and standards in the zero-knowledge area has been founded in 2018.
3Zero-knowledge proofs are on the rise in Gartners’ Hype Cycle for Privacy 2019, cf. https:
//www.gartner.com/en/documents/3947373/hype-cycle-for-privacy-2019.
4MIT technology review mentioned zk-SNARKS as one of the “10 Breakthrough Technologies
of 2018” cf. https://www.technologyreview.com/lists/technologies/2018/.
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and Quasi-Adaptive Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge arguments (QA-NIZKs) in
the common reference string (CRS) model. QA-NIZK constructions are a relax-
ation of NIZK proofs while the CRS depends on the specific language parameter
for which proofs have to be generated [17, 100, 102, 106, 110, 111].
So far there has been a tight relation between zero-knowledge proofs and com-
mitment schemes. In most of the zero-knowledge protocols, the use of commit-
ment schemes is crucial in a way that by using commitment schemes one can make
a claim (statement) and later use the zero-knowledge proof techniques to prove the
claim. In real-world applications of the cryptographic protocols i.e, commitment
schemes and zero-knowledge proofs, they have to satisfy a strong property called
Universal Composability (UC) which were introduced by [52]. Informally, UC-
secure protocols ensure the security even if executed with other instances of the
same protocol, or when composed with other protocols. Due that there has been
several efforts [7, 26, 109] to construct UC-secure NIZKs (UC-secure SNARKs)
and [4–6, 27, 74, 100] to achieve UC-secure commitment schemes where zero-
knowledge proofs are at the core of some of them. However, adding universal
composability to such schemes often needs to scarify the efficiency, therefore hav-
ing efficient UC-secure protocols is still an important need in practice and for lots
of applications.
Another important issue for the practical use of NIZKs is the requirement of
a trusted setup for generating CRS. Recently there have some efforts to minimize
trust in such systems. To this aim, Bellare et al. in [22] initiated different no-
tions of resistance to CRS subversion and their achievability. They introduced
subversion soundness (Sub-SND), meaning that no adversary can create a CRS
(possibly malicious) along with valid proof for a false statement. They also in-
troduced a subversion-resistant analogue for zero-knowledge, meaning that the
zero-knowledge property even remains when the CRS is generated maliciously,
i.e., the CRS generator is subverted. In a different line of research [7, 26] has
employed multi-party computation (MPC) techniques to decrease the trust of the
CRS generation’s procedure.
1.1. Scope and Claim of This Thesis
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the CRS model are increasingly getting
attention in real-world applications and distributed ledger technologies such as
cryptocurrencies. Thus such NIZK should have fast verification and small proof
sizes. These desired properties are provided by QA-NIZKs and zk-SNARKs.
As we noted before the important issues for the practical use of NIZKs are
(i) the need for a trusted setup for generating CRS, and (ii) adding universal com-
posability to guarantee that security remains if the protocol is concurrently run
with other protocols or even copies of itself. In this thesis, we mainly focus on
these subjects and present some concrete constructions that provide the afore-
mentioned properties. More precisely, in the line of diminishing the trust, we
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show how one can construct a subversion zero-knowledge version of the most
efficient5 zk SNARK [94] and the most efficient QA-NIZK [106] constructions
where the zero-knowledge property of the constructions remains when the CRS
is subverted. In terms of universal composability issue, by using smooth pro-
jective hash functions (SPHFs), we first introduce a new cryptographic primitive
called publicly computable SPHFs (PC-SPHFs) and construct the currently most
efficient non-interactive UC-secure commitment. Then we develop a new tech-
nique for constructing UC-secure commitments and propose a new scheme called
DL-extractable commitment that allows one to generate CRS of zk-SNARKs in a
UC-secure manner.
Zero-Knowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs were introduced by Goldwasser
et al. [86] which is a cryptographic protocol between the two parties called the
verifier and the prover. Roughly speaking, in such system the prover wants to
convince the verifier of his claim (more formally the membership of a statement
in any language L ) without revealing any more information of her witness w
warranting language membership of word x (called zero-knowledge property).
Besides that, such a system needs to guarantee that the prover can not convince
the verifier with provided proofs for words outside of the language, this property
is called soundness. While zero-knowledge proofs, generally, may need some
rounds of interaction, a variant highly proper with practical applications is non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [33]. They need only a single round
in a way that the prover provides proofs which then can be verified by only one
round.
There are two models used to obtain NIZK from interactive zero-knowledge
proofs: (i) the random oracle (RO) model, and (ii) the common reference string
(CRS) model. In this thesis, we are mainly interested in the CRS model, in which
both the prover and the verifier have access to a structured random string generated
by some trusted setup. In practice, such a CRS can be generated by multi-party
computation.
Trust in the CRS. An important aspect of practical applications of NIZKs, es-
pecially for zk-SNARKs is the challenge of the generation of CRS or structured
random string [33]. While the CRS model is widely accepted, one has to guarantee
that the CRS has been generated honestly, meaning that no one knows the asso-
ciated trapdoor to the CRS which allows breaking soundness or zero-knowledge
property. In theory, it is easily solved by assuming some trusted party that pro-
vides the CRS, but implementing such a party is hard in the real-world.
For NIZK proofs, Bellare et al. [22] tried to tackle this problem by studying
the security one still can achieve when the CRS is subverted. They proved several
5The efficiency respect to the size of the proof and the verification compelexity.
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positive and negative results. More precisely, they proved that it is impossible
to achieve simultaneously subversion soundness and zero-knowledge (even non-
subversion). While subversion zero-knowledge (Sub-ZK) can be achieved. We
consider this notion for SNARKs and QA-NIZKs in this thesis and published the
results in [9, 11] 6 which can be used in practical applications in cryptocurren-
cies [51, 77] 7. In the line of diminishing the trust, some systems such as Zcash
and Ethereum employed an alternative route to implementing the CRS generation
and used a secure multi-party computation (MPC) [26, 39, 126] for zk-SNARKs
instead of building them on top of subversion-resistant zk-SNARKs.
Very recently, Groth et al. [96] introduced the novel notion of updatable zk-
SNARKs in which every party can update the CRS of SNARK to diminish the
trust in the generation of CRS. While there is a way to check the correctness of an
update. Here, zero-knowledge holds in the presence of a malicious CRS genera-
tor and the verifier can trust the CRS (soundness holds) as long as one operation,
either the creation of the CRS or one update, has been performed honestly. Updat-
able zk-SNARKs also are crucially Sub-zk-SNARKs. This technique is promis-
ing, but it is still inefficient for practical applications and currently, there are some
efforts [58, 89, 107, 117] to make it usable in real-world applications.
SPHF. Smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs, [60]) for a languageLlpar, pa-
rameterized by a language parameter lpar, are cryptographic primitives with the
following properties. Given a word x, one can compute a hash of it in two dif-
ferent ways: either (i) using a projection key hp (an analogue of a public key), a
word x, and a witness w, as pH← projhash(lpar;hp,x,w), or (ii) using a hash-
ing key hk (an analogue of a secret key) and a word x, as H← hash(lpar;hk,x).
where the algorithms projhash and hash are respectively the projection hash and
the hash generators. If x ∈Llpar and w is a correct witness of this fact, then the
correctness property guarantees that the two ways of computing the hash result in
the same value, pH = H. If x 6∈L , then the smoothness property guarantees that,
knowing hp but not hk, one cannot distinguish H from random. SPHFs are use-
ful in many different applications, starting from constructing IND-CCA2 secure
cryptosystems [60] and password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [83], and
ending with honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK, [30]) and NIZK [2]. Later
in Section 4.1 of this thesis we introduce a new primitive based on SPHFs, called
publicly computable SPHFs (PC-SPHFs) and use it to construct a generic frame-
work for non-interactive UC-secure commitment schemes (this result is published
in [10]).
UC-secure commitment. Another important aspect for practical applications of
6Later we improved the security of both the constructions by adding a strong security property
is called Simulation Extractability (SE) in [13–15] and they are not included in this thesis.
7Also Fuchsbauer [76] implemented the notation with a different technique for zk-SNARKS.
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cryptographic protocols such as NIZKs (i.e, for implementing its CRS) and com-
mitment schemes is achieving universal composability. This is a strong property
and was introduced by [52]. Informally, UC-secure protocols ensure the security
even if executed with other instances of this same protocol, or when composed
with other protocols. A commitment scheme allows a committer C to transmit an
analogue of a sealed envelope of her message m to a receiver R. Later the commit-
ter C can open her committed message with m and some additional information.
The receiver R verifies whether m is correctly enveloped. Such systems should
guarantee that C cannot change later the enveloped message m to some m′ 6= m
(binding property); while the receiver R must not learn any information of the
enveloped message m (hiding property).
In order to attach the UC property to commitment schemes, one needs to pro-
vide the following additional properties:(i) extractability, states that given a trap-
door, one (i.e, the simulator Sim in UC proof) can recover the committed value
m, and (ii) equivocability means that given a trapdoor, one (i.e, the simulator
Sim in UC proof) can open a commitment to any message m′ 6= m. In Chapter 4
of this thesis we investigate constructing efficient UC-secure commitments; one
with using PC-SPHF which is currently the most efficient non-interactive UC-
secure commitment [10], and another one [6] with a new technique that allows
one to generate CRS of zk-SNARKs in a UC secure manner. Later Abdolmaleki
et al. [7] used the latter construction to generate the CRS of SNARK [94] with
multi-party computation in UC-secure manner.
1.2. Thesis Outline and Contributions
In this part, we outline the contents of chapters in the thesis, and briefly explain
the main contributions of the author towards the co-authored papers.
Chapter 2 provides a quick overview of the preliminaries, basic assumptions
and the primitives used throughout this thesis. In particular, in this chapter, we
introduce zk-SNARKs and QA-NIZK constructions and their security require-
ments which we use throughout this thesis to construct subversion zk-SNARKs
and QA-NIZKs. Also, we mention the various assumptions, encryption schemes
and SPHFs primitives used in constructing UC-secure commitment schemes in
the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 introduces the notation of NIZKs (focusing on zk-SNARKs and QA-
NIZK) with a subverted setup. Mainly it describes the challenges and the ideas
of building such constructions and shows how one can construct subversion zk-
SNARKS and QA-NIZK. This chapter refers to the following two papers included
in this thesis.
I Behzad Abdolmaleki, Karim Baghery, Helger Lipmaa, and Michal Zajac. A
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subversion-resistant SNARK. In ASIACRYPT 2017, volume 10626 of LNCS,
pages 3-33, Springer, Heidelberg.
This paper investigates the zk-SNARKs when the CRS is subverted. In ASI-
ACRYPT 2016, Bellare et al. [22] studied the security, one still can achieve
when the CRS is subverted (the CRS is generated by a malicious party) and
proved several positive and negative results. On the positive side, they proved
that it is possible to achieve simultaneously subversion zero-knowledge and
soundness in NIZK constructions. This paper studies the subversion zero-
knowledge security for Groth’s zk-SNARK for CIRCUIT-SAT from EURO-
CRYPT 2016 and implements the subversion security definitions of [22].
Then it shows how one can achieve Groth’s zk-SNARK [94] in subverted
setup (when the setup is maliciously created) without effecting the com-
plexity of the verification and the proof’s size of the construction. The au-
thor’s contributions consist of a complexity analysis of our Sub-zk-SANRK
construction, a comparison between the proposed construction with existing
works, and finally providing an improvement on the efficiency of the CRS
verification algorithm.
II Behzad Abdolmaleki, Helger Lipmaa, Janno Siim, and Michal Zajac. On
QA-NIZK in the BPK Model. In PKC 2020, volume 12110-12111 of LNCS,
Springer, Heidelberg..
This paper addresses a conceptually important observation that subversion
zero-knowledge in the CRS model is equal to no-auxiliary-string non-black-
box zero-knowledge (called nonuniform zero-knowledge) in the bare public
key (BPK) model. This important nexus was missed in the previous work
on subversion zero-knowledge and makes it more accessible to construct and
analyze those systems including both SNARKs and QA-NIZKs. Also, it de-
fines a new notion of subversion security for QA-NIZKs. Finally, this pa-
per shows how one can construct a subversion version of the most efficient
known QA-NIZK for linear subspaces presented by Kiltz and Wee. In the
end, it proves that the scheme is nonuniform zero knowledge in the BPK
model under some novel non-falsifiable assumptions. The author’s contribu-
tions include improving the public key verification algorithm, parts of secu-
rity definitions of QA-NIZKs in BPK model, investigating the applications
of the new construction and parts of the security proofs.
Chapter 4 mainly addresses how to construct UC-secure commitment schemes
with the focus on (i) the efficiency of the scheme and (ii) compatibility with the
UC-secure MPC. The latter property plays a crucial role to guarantee the UC
security of the CRS generation of zk-SNARKs. This chapter first introduces a new
cryptographic primitive called PC-SPHFs and constructs a generic framework for
non-interactive UC-secure commitment. Then it develops a new technique for
constructing UC-secure commitments schemes that allow one to generate CRS
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of zk-SNARKs in a UC secure manner. This chapter refers to the following two
papers included in this thesis.
I Behzad Abdolmaleki, Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh, and Daniel Slamanig. A
Framework for UC-Secure Commitments from Publicly Computable Smooth
Projective Hashing. In IMACC 2019, volume 11929, pages 1-21, Springer,
Cham. This paper first revisits the notion of SPHFs and introduces a new
property (a third mode of constructing the hashing) that enables to com-
pute the hash value of an SPHF without knowing neither the hashing key
nor the witness, but some auxiliary information. This new type of SPHFs is
called PC-SPHFs. Later it shows how this new primitive leads generically
to UC-secure commitment schemes (secure against adaptive adversaries, as-
suming erasures). Finally, it shows that instantiating the PC-SPHF with la-
beled Cramer-Shoup encryption [60] returns the currently most efficient non-
interactive UC-secure commitment. The author constructed the new primi-
tive, PC-SPHF and proposed the new UC-secure framework for commitment
schemes together with their security proofs. The author also constructed the
efficient non-interactive UC-secure commitment scheme.
II Behzad Abdolmaleki, Karim Baghery, Helger Lipmaa, Janno Siim, and Michal
Zajac. DL-extractable UC-commitment schemes. In ACNS 2019, volume
11464 of LNCS, pages 385-405. Springer, Heidelberg.
This paper proposes a new UC functionality and constructs a corresponding
UC-secure commitment (DL-extractable UC-secure commitment scheme) that
fits the following setting: when the secrecy of a committed value x is impor-
tant and revealing x enables to break the privacy of the scheme; while in the
UC setting the simulator needs to know x to simulate the corrupted commit-
ter C. More precisely DL-extractable UC-secure commitment schemes allow
the committer C to open a commitment to a group element gx while in the UC
security proof the simulator can extract the integer x. The author’s contribu-
tions include parts of designing the new UC functionality for such commit-
ment schemes and the UC-security proofs of the DL-extractable UC-secure
commitment scheme.
Chapter 5 summarizes the author’s works on the important issues for the practi-
cal use of NIZKs that (i) need a trusted setup for generating CRS, and (ii) adds a
universal composability to guarantee that security remains if the protocol is con-
currently run with other protocols or even copies of itself. This chapter also points
out the open problems left in the research line of the thesis.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we provide the preliminaries, basic assumptions and the primitives
used throughout this thesis. First, we recall some standard computational and
mathematical concepts. Then we recall some well-known computational assump-
tions and also provide most of the cryptographic tools and primitives used in this
work, including commitment schemes, encryption schemes, NIZKs, SNARKs,
QA-NIZKs, and SPHFs.
2.1. Notation
We define N to be the set of positive integers and Z be the set of integers. We
denote the security parameter by λ . A function f : N→ [0,1] is called negligible
if f (λ ) = O(λ−c) for every constant c ∈ N. We denote this by f ≈λ 0. We define
by negl (λ ) a negligible function of λ . We write a≈λ b if |a−b| ≤ negl (λ ).
Integers modulo p are denoted by Zp and the ring of polynomials with vari-
ables X1, . . . ,Xn over Zp by Zp[X1, . . . ,Xn]. Vectors a := (ai)ni=1 ∈ Znp are column
vectors by default and are usually denoted by bold lower-case letters. Length n
vector of ones is denoted by 1n and vector of zeros by 0n. Matrices A ∈ Zn×mp are
denoted bold upper-case letters and i-th row vector of A is denoted by Ai. Identity
matrix is denoted by In ∈ Zn×np . Set {1, . . . ,n} is denoted by [n].
Sampling x from a distribution D is written as x←$D . If D is a set, then
x←$D means uniform sampling. We often express probabilities in the form
Pr[x←$D : Pred(x)] where D is a probability distribution and Pred some pred-
icate. Probabilistic polynomial time is abbreviated by PPT. Random tape RND
is a Turing machine tape which stores infinitely many bits, each bit is selected
independently and uniformly at random from {0,1} before the execution of the
algorithm. Let RNDλ (A) denote the random tape of an algorithm A (assuming
the given value of λ )1. We denote sampling sufficiently long randomness by
r←$ RNDλ (A) and A outputting y on input x and random coins r is denoted by
y← A(x;r). For the sake of simplicity, we may often leave out the random coins
and just write y←A(x). We assume that algorithms are stateful, e.g., we may first
execute A on input x and then again on another input y without A losing its state
from the first execution.
Pairings. Let Pgen be a PPT algorithm (a bilinear group generator) that on
input 1λ outputs a tuple p = (p, eˆ,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2) where p is a prime of length
Θ(λ ), G1, G2, GT are additive groups of order p with an efficient operation, g1
and g2 are respectively the generators of G1 and G2. The function eˆ is a map
G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties: (i) Bilinearity: eˆ(gx1,gY2 ) = gxyT
where gT := eˆ(g1,g2) for any x,y ∈ Zp, (ii) Non-degeneracy: gT as defined above
is a non-zero element and thus also a generator of the target groupGT , and (iii) Ef-
1A PPT A is able to read only polynomially many (in security parameter λ ) of the random tape.
22
ficiency: eˆ can be efficiently computed. Pairings are usually divided into three
types: Type 1 pairings have G1 =G2, Type 2 pairings have G1 6=G2, and Type 3
pairings have G1 6= G2 even such that there is no efficiently computable isomor-
phism between G1 and G2. Type 3 pairings are currently the most widely used
due to their efficiency and also in this thesis, we will use Type 3 pairings. In this
thesis we use them as a black box and for state-of-the-art pairings, we refer the
reader to [20].
We use the bracket notation of [71], that is, we write [a]ι to denote gaι where
gι is a fixed generator of Gι . We denote eˆ(ga1,gb2) = eˆ([a]1, [b]2) as [a]1[b]2. Thus,
[a]1[b]2 = [ab]T . We denote s[a]ι = [sa]ι for s ∈ Zp. We freely use the bracket
notation together with matrix notation, for example, if XY = Z then [X ]1[Y ]2 =
[Z]T where X , Y , and Z are matrices.
Lagrange polynomials. Let ω1, . . . ,ωn+1 be unique elements in Zp. Lagrange
polynomial `i(X) is the unique n-th degree polynomial such that `i(ωi) = 1 and
`i(ω j) = 0 for j 6= i. More explicitly we may express `i(X) =
n+1
∏
j 6=i
X−ωi
ω j−ωi . La-
grange polynomials `1(X), . . . , `n+1(X) form a basis for all polynomials in Zp[X ]
which are at most degree n. Lagrange polynomials are often used for interpola-
tion. Namely, if f ∈Zp[X ] has a degree at most n and f (ωi) = ai for i∈ [1 ..n+1],
then f (X) =
n+1
∑
i=1
ai`i(X).
2.2. Computational Assumptions
In cryptography to prove security of a primitive we usually apply reduction tech-
nique which allows reducing the problem to a previously known hard problem.
Then these two problems are called polynomial-time equivalent if the reduction
is provided in polynomial time. Besides, we define security for some particular
fixed size input. This shows non-uniformity, as an adversary A maybe given the
input as an auxiliary string to solve some computational problems of the same
size. In contrast with complexity theory 2, in cryptography, we usually use the
hardness of computational assumptions in the average case. In the cryptographic
protocols, for the security against non-uniform PPT adversary, we use the fact
that if one breaks the protocol, then she can solve a hard problem in the average
case. Note that we assume a non-uniform PPT adversary A is successful if, with
non-negligible probability in the security parameter λ , she returns a solution for
the computational problem.
Let GPgen be a PPT group generator that on input 1λ outputs gp = (p,G,g)
whereG is an additive group of prime order p=Θ(λ ) and g is a random generator
of the group. Let Pgen be a PPT algorithm (A bilinear group generator) that
on input 1λ outputs a tuple p = (p, eˆ,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2) where G1, G2, GT are
2In complexity theory, most problems are based on the hardness in the worst-case.
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additive groups of order p with an efficient operation, g1 and g2 are respectively
the generators of G1 and G2. The function eˆ is a map G1×G2 → GT . We still
use the bracket notation to represent group elements. We recall the computational
assumptions that are used in this thesis.
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption [34]). . Let ι ∈
{1,2}. DDH holds relative to GPgen, for every PPT adversaryA , |ExpDDHA (gp)−
1/2| ≈λ 0, where ExpDDHA (gp) :=
Pr
[
gp←$ GPgen(1λ );u,v,w←$Zp;b←${0,1};
b∗←A (gp, [u]ι , [v]ι , [b ·uv+(1−b)w]ι) : b = b
∗
]
,
Definition 2 (Hard-Subset-Membership Languages). Let Llpar be a language
parameterized with some language parameters lpar. Let Rlpar be the corre-
sponding binary relation of all pairs (x,w) where x that we call a statement is
in Llpar and w is any of the efficiently verifiable witnesses for x. Let Xlpar
be the underlying domain of the language Llpar (e.g., a group). A hard-subset-
membership language family (Llpar ⊆Xlpar)lpar is a language family and sat-
isfying the following properties. Here, Pgen.lpar(p) is an efficient algorithm that
— given system parameters p — outputs the language parameter lpar together
with a language trapdoor td (a secret key of the language parameter lpar).
R-sampleability. There exists a PPT algorithm that takes as input a parameter
lpar and randomly samples words x fromLlpar together with a valid wit-
ness w, according to some distribution (which might not be uniform). We
write (x,w)←$Rlpar to say that x and w are sampled by this algorithm. We
write x←$Llpar when w is not important. We assume that for any lpar
and any (x,w) sampled by this algorithm, (x,w) ∈Rlpar.
(X \L )-sampleability. There exists a PPT algorithm which takes as input a pa-
rameter lpar and randomly samples words x fromXlpar\Llpar according
to some distribution (which might not be uniform). We write x←$Xlpar \
Llpar to say that x is sampled by this algorithm. We assume that for any
lpar and any x sampled by this algorithm, x ∈Xlpar \Llpar.
Hard-subset-membership. Randomly sampled words x from Llpar and from
Xlpar \Llpar (by the two previous algorithms respectively) are compu-
tationally indistinguishable, without knowing td. Formally, for a language
L and adversary A , let AdvsubsetL ,A (λ ) be the advantage A has in distin-
guishing x0 ∈L and x1 ∈X \L : AdvsubsetL ,A (λ ) = 2 · |εL −1/2|, where
εL :=Pr
[
p←$ Pgen(1λ );(lpar, td)←$ Pgen.lpar(p);
b←${0,1};x0←$L ;x1←$X \L ;b′←A (lpar;xb) : b = b′
]
.
The language is hard-subset-membership, if this advantage is negligible,
for any polynomial-time adversary A .
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In what follows, let Dk be taken as the uniform distribution over a set of all
matrices in Z(k+1)×kp . So A←$Dk means that each ai j←$Z∗p, which in [71] is
denoted as Uk, i.e., Dk :=Uk.
Thus A←$Dk:
Uk: A =

a11 . . . a1k
. . . . . . . . .
ak1 . . . akk
a(k+1)1 . . . a(k+1)k

Definition 3 (Dk-Matrix Diffie-Hellman (Dk-MDDH) Assumption [122]). The
Dk-MDDH assumption for ι ∈ {1,2} holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT ad-
versary A , |ExpMDDHA (p)−1/2| ≈λ 0, where ExpMDDHA (p) :=
Pr
 p←$ Pgen(1λ );A←$Dk;v←$Zkp;u←$Zk+1p ;b←${0,1};
b∗←A (p, [A]ι , [u]ι , [b ·Av+(1−b) ·u]ι)
: b = b∗
 .
Definition 4 (Dk-KerMDH Assumption [122]). TheDk-KerMDH assumption for
ι ∈ {1,2} holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );A←$Dk; [s]3−ι ←A (p, [A]ι) :
s 6= 0∧A>s = 0k
]
≈λ 0 .
Note that as it is shown in [122], if Dk-MDDH holds then Dk-KerMDH holds.
Definition 5 (Dk-SKerMDH Assumption [87]). The Dk-SKerMDH assumption
holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );A←$Dk;([s1]1, [s2]2)←A (p, [A]1, [A]2) :
s1− s2 6= 0∧A>(s1− s2) = 0k
]
≈λ 0 .
2.3. Knowledge Assumptions
In knowledge assumptions, we assume that if one (i.e, an adversary A ) can com-
pute some value together with accompanying values which are called knowledge
components, then she knows essentially how the values have been computed. In
such definitions, we usually use an algorithm ExtA which extracts the knowl-
edge components (the value) with polynomial overhead. Abe and Fehr in [16]
introduced the notation (z,y)← (A ||ExtA )(x,r) meaning that if the algorithmA
with input (x,r) outputs a tuple of values z, then the algorithm ExtA with the same
input (x,r) outputs a tuple of values y. 3 In this thesis, we utilize some variants of
the following knowledge assumptions.
3Where usually r is the random coins of A .
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Definition 6 (KoE Assumption [61]). We say that Pgen is Knowledge of Exponent
(KoE) secure if for any p← Pgen(1λ ), ι ∈ {1,2,T}, and PPT adversary A there
exists a PPT extractor ExtKoEA , such that
Pr
[
r←$ RNDλ (A ),x←$Zp;([α1]ι , [α2]ι ||a)← (A ||ExtKoEA )(p, [x]ι ;r) :
[α1]ι = x[α2]ι ∧ [α2]ι 6= [a]ι
]
≈λ 0 .
Intuitively, given only [1]ι and [x]ι it is assumed to be hard to generate a pair
of the form ([a]ι ,a[x]ι) unless one starts by simply choosing a ∈ Zp.
Definition 7 (BDH-KE Knowledge Assumption [9]). Let R be a relation and
auxR be the auxiliary information4 related to R. We say that Pgen is Bilin-
ear Diffie-Hellman Knowledge of Exponents (BDH-KE) secure for R if for any
(R,auxR) ∈ range(R(1λ )) and PPT adversary A there exists a PPT extractor
ExtBDH-KEA , such that
Pr
[
r←$ RNDλ (A );([α1]1, [α2]2||a)← (A ||ExtBDH-KEA )(R,auxR ;r) :
[α1]1[1]2 = [1]1[α2]2∧a 6= α1
]
≈λ 0 .
Notice that one may view the BDH-KE assumption as a simple case of the
Power Knowledge of Exponent (PKE) assumption of [64] (where A is given as
an input the tuple {([xi]1, [xi]2)}ni=0 for some n≥ 0, and assumed that ifA outputs
([α]1, [α]2) then she knows (a0,a1, . . . ,an), such that α =
n
∑
i=0
aixi. ) as used in
the case of asymmetric pairings in [64]. Therefore, BDH-KE can be viewed as an
asymmetric-pairing version of the original KoE assumption [61].
2.4. Universal Composability
The Universal Composability (UC) framework was introduced by Canetti in [52].
In the UC framework, one analyzes the security of the protocol under the real-
world and ideal-world paradigm. More precisely, in this setting, the real-world
execution of a protocol is compared with an ideal-world interaction with the prim-
itive that it implements. Then a composition theorem in this model states that the
security of the UC-secure protocols remains if it is arbitrarily composed with other
UC-secure protocols or the protocol itself. Additionally, the UC-secure property
guarantees security in practical applications where individual instances of proto-
cols are run in parallel, such as the internet. The entities in the UC framework in
both ideal-word and real-word executions are modeled as PPT interactive Turing
machines that send and receive messages through respectively their output and
input tapes.
4In this thesis, the auxiliary information is the group description that contains the generator and
the size of the group. In general, if we allow any auxiliary information then we have non-uniform
PPT adversaries (a family of circuits). If we would not have such powerful adversaries, then we
usually put some restrictions over the auxiliary information.
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In the ideal world execution, dummy parties (possibly controlled by an ideal-
word adversary Sim, also called simulator) communicate directly with the ideal
functionalityF . The ideal functionality can be viewed as a trusted party that cre-
ates the primitives to implement the protocol. Correspondingly, in the real-world
execution, parties (possibly corrupted by a real-world adversaryA ) communicate
with each other as a protocol Π that realizes the ideal functionality. Both the ideal
and real executions are controlled by the environment Z , an entity that sends in-
puts and receives the outputs of A , the individual parties, and Sim. Finally, after
seeing the ideal or real protocol execution, Z returns a bit, which is considered
as the output of the execution. Then the rationale behind this framework lies in
showing that the environment Z can not efficiently distinguish between the ideal
and real executions, therefore meaning that the real-world protocol is as secure as
the ideal-world (the ideal functionality).
Besides, the two aforementioned models (real-world and ideal-world) of com-
putation, the UC framework considers the hybrid-world, where the executions are
similar to the real-world but with the additional assumption that the parties are
allowed to access to an auxiliary ideal functionality G . More precisely, in this
case, instead of honest parties interacting directly with the ideal functionality, the
adversary passes all the messages from and to the ideal functionality. Also, the
transmission channels are considered to be ideally authenticated, meaning that the
adversary is not able to modify the messages but only able to read them. Unlike
information transferred between parties, which can be read by the adversary, the
information transferred between parties and the ideal functionality is split into a
public and private header. The private header carries some information like as the
private inputs of parties and it cannot be read by the adversary. The public header
carries only some information that can be viewed publicly such as receiver, sender,
type of a message, and session identifiers. Let denote the output of the environ-
ment Z that shows the execution of a protocol Π in a real-world model and a
hybrid model, respectively as IDEALFSim and HYBRID
G
Π,A . Then the UC security
is formally defined as:
Definition 8. A n-party (n ∈ N) protocol Π UC-realizes an ideal functionalityF
in the hybrid model if, for every PPT adversary A , there exists a simulator Sim
such that for all environments Z ,
IDEALFSim ≈λ HYBRIDGΠ,A .
The protocol Π is statistically secure if the above definition holds for all un-
bounded Z . In Chapter 4, we define the ideal functionality for a commitment
scheme and provide its corresponding hybrid functionality to prove the UC secu-
rity of the scheme.
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2.5. Public-Key Cryptosystems
Labeled Public-Key Encryption. Labeled encryption is a variant of the public-
key encryption where encryption and decryption take an additional label. Decryp-
tion should only work if the label used for decryption is identical to the one used
when producing the ciphertext. More formally:
Definition 9. A labeled (tagged) public-key encryption scheme Π= (KGen,Enc,
Dec), is defined by three algorithms:
KGen(1λ ): given a security parameter λ , generates a public key pk and a secret
key sk.
Encτpk(M): given the public key pk, a label τ and a message M, outputs a cipher-
text C.
Decτsk(C): given a label τ , the secret key sk and a ciphertext C, with C=Enc
τ
pk(M),
outputs M.
For correctness, it is required that for all (pk,sk) ∈ KGen(1λ ), all labels τ and
all messages M, Decτsk(Enc
τ
pk(M)) = M. Henceforth, we use public-key encryp-
tion schemes that provide indistinguishability under chosen plaintext and adaptive
chosen ciphertexts attacks, i.e., provide IND-CPA or IND-CCA security respec-
tively.
(Labeled) Cramer-Shoup encryption [60]. The Cramer-Shoup (CS) IND-
CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme in group G1 of order p is defined as
follows: the secret key sk is (x1,x2,y1,y2,z)←$Z5p. Assume [g1]1, [g2]1 are two
different generators ofG1. Let H be a collision-resistant hash function. The public
key is pk = ([g1,g2,h,c,d]1,H), where [c]1 = x1[g1]1 + x2[g2]1, [d]1 = y1[g1]1 +
y2[g2]1, h = z[g1]1. The encryption of [m]1 with randomness r←$Zp is defined
as [C]1 = [u1,u2,e,v]1 where [u1]1 = r[g1]1, [u2]1 = r[g2]1, [e]1 = [m]1 + r[h]1,
[v]1 = r([c]1 + ξ [d]1), where ξ = H([u1]1, [u2]1, [e]1). In case of labeled CS with
label τ , the hash value is computed as ξ = H(τ, [u1]1, [u2]1, [e]1).
2.6. Commitment Schemes
Definition 10. A commitment scheme Π = (KGen,Commit,Decommit), is de-
fined by the following three algorithms:
KGen(1λ ): given a security parameter λ , generates public parameter p of the
scheme that implicitly passed as input to the other algorithms.
Commit(p,m,r): given the public parameter p, a message m from message space
M, and a randomness r from randomness space R, outputs a commitment c
together with an opening information δ 5.
5The opening information will be used in the decommit phase to prove that the commitment c
contains a valid message m.
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Decommit(p,c,m,δ ): given given the public parameter p, a commitment c, the
message m and an opening information δ , outputs m or ⊥ if the opening
verification fails.
Such a scheme must satisfy both hiding property (meaning that the commit
phase does not disclose any information about the committed message m), and
binding property (meaning that the decommit phase (opening phase) can success-
fully open to only one value). The aforementioned properties may be achieved
in a perfect, statistical or computational, according to the power of the adversary
against those properties. Besides, some additional strong properties are demanded
in some systems like the UC-secure commitment scheme. The first is extractabil-
ity which states that given a trapdoor, one (i.e, the simulator Sim in UC model)
can recover the committed value m. The second one is equivocability which means
that given a trapdoor, one (i.e, the simulator Sim in UC model) can open a com-
mitment to any message m′ 6= m.
Pedersen Commitment [127]. The Pedersen commitment is an equivocable
commitment and defined as follows: (i) the KGen(1λ ) generates a groupG1 of or-
der p, with two generators [g]1 and [h]1 = s[g]1 where s∈Zp. Sets p= ([g]1, [h]1).
(ii) The Commit(p,m,r) algorithm for a message m∈Zp and the random element
r←$Zp, computes the commitment c=m[g]1+ r[h]1; while the opening informa-
tion δ = r, and (iii) the Decommit(p,c,m,δ ) algorithm returns m and r and allows
to check the validity of the commitment by verifying that c=? m[g]1+r[h]1. Such
a commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assump-
tion. Also it is an equivocable commitment since given the secret value (the dis-
crete logarithm s) as additional information (or a trapdoor), one can open the com-
mitment to any message m′ 6= m. Notice that the Cramer-Shoup encryption [60]
can be viewed as an extractable commitment scheme.
2.7. Smooth Projective Hash Functions
Let Llpar ⊂Xlpar be a language parameterized by lpar (the language parame-
ter), whereXlpar is the underlying domain, e.g., a group. A projective hash func-
tion (PHF, [60]) for {Llpar} is a tuple of PPT algorithms PHF=(Pgen,Pgen.lpar,
hashkg,projkg,hash,projhash), defined as follows. Here,Rlpar is the relation de-
fined byLlpar = {x : ∃w,(x,w) ∈Rlpar}.
Pgen(1λ ): takes a security parameter λ and generates the global parameters p
(we assume that all algorithms have access to p).
Pgen.lpar(p): sets up the language parameters lpar (with its trapdoor tds),
hashkg(lpar): inputs a language parameter lpar. It generates and outputs a
hashing key hk forLlpar.
projkg(lpar;hk,x): inputs a language parameter lpar, a hashing key hk, and
possibly a word x ∈Xlpar. It outputs deterministically a projection key hp.
hash(lpar;hk,x): inputs a language parameter lpar, a hashing key hk, and a
word x ∈Xlpar. It outputs deterministically a hash value H.
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projhash(lpar;hp,x,w): inputs a language parameter lpar, a projection key hp,
a word x, and a witness w for x ∈Llpar (i.e., (x,w) ∈ Rlpar). It outputs
deterministically a projected hash value pH.
The set of hash values is called the range of PHF and is denoted by Π. We assume
Π to be efficiently sampleable and that Π has size that is exponential in λ .
In what follows, lpar contains p and some public parameters specifying the
relation (e.g., an encryption key). A distribution Dp (e.g., the output distribution
of Pgen.lpar(p)) on Lρ is witness-sampleable [100] if there exists a PPT algo-
rithm Pgen.lpar(p) that samples (lpar, td) ∈ Rp such that lpar is distributed
according to Dp, and membership of x in the parameter language Llpar can be
verified in PPT given td. We always assume that lpar can be efficiently computed
from td. In the related work, Dp is often assumed to be witness-sampleable, even
if it is not always necessary.
A PHF is perfectly correct if for all parameters lpar ∈ im(Pgen.lpar(p)),
(x,w) ∈Rlpar, hk ∈ im(hashkg(lpar)), and hp← projkg(lpar;hk), the follow-
ing holds, hash(lpar;hk,x) = projhash(lpar;hp,x,w).
There are at least three types of smooth PHFs (SPHFs). Intuitively, in GL-
SPHF [83], we want security even in the case hp can maliciously depend on x.
On the other hand, in KV-SPHF [104], we want security even in the case x can
maliciously depend on hp. The third type is CS-SPHF, [60]. See [24, Section 2.5]
for more information.
A PHF PHF = (Pgen,Pgen.lpar,hashkg,projkg,hash,projhash) for a lan-
guage L ⊆X is ε-GL/CS-smooth if for any lpar and any word x ∈Xlpar \
Llpar, the following distributions are ε-close:
{(hp,H) : hk←$ hashkg(lpar);hp← projkg(lpar;hk,x);H← hash(lpar;hk,x)}
{(hp,H) : hk←$ hashkg(lpar);hp← projkg(lpar;hk,x);H←$Π}
A PHF is GL/CS-smooth if it is ε-GL/CS-smooth with ε negligible in λ .
An SPHF satisfying this smoothness definition is called
• a CS-smooth projective hash function (CS-SPHF) if hp does not depend on
x (i.e., projkg does not use its input x),
• a GL-smooth projective hash function (GL-SPHF) if hp may depend on x.
A PHF PHF = (Pgen,Pgen.lpar,hashkg,projkg,hash,projhash) for a lan-
guage L ⊆X is ε-KV-smooth if for any lpar and any (not necessarily com-
putable in polynomial-time) function f from the set of possible projection keys
hp toXlpar \Llpar, the following distributions are ε-close:
{(hp,H) : hk←$ hashkg(lpar);hp← projkg(lpar;hk);H← hash(lpar;hk, f (hp))}
{(hp,H) : hk←$ hashkg(lpar);hp← projkg(lpar;hk);H←$Π}
A PHF is KV-smooth if it is ε-KV-smooth with ε negligible in λ . Since projkg
does not depend on x in this case, we often omit x as an argument for projkg.
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An ε-smooth CS-SPHF is not necessarily an ε-smooth KV-SPHF, but a 0-
smooth CS-SPHF is always a 0-smooth KV-SPHF, [24, Remark 2.5.4]. In this
thesis, we will explicitly deal with GL-SPHFs (GL-smooth PHFs) and KV-SPHFs
(KV-smooth PHFs), ignoring CS-SPHFs (CS-smooth PHFs).
Smooth Projective Hash Function for (Labeled) CS Ciphertexts. Ben-
hamouda et al. [27, 28] presented KV-SPHF for (Labeled) CS encryption [60].
Briefly in this construction, the hashing key is a vector hk=(η1,η2,θ ,µ, ι)←$Z5p,
and for a word for CS ciphertext [C]1, the projection key is, hp= (hp1 = η1[g1]1+
θ [g2]1+µ[h]1+ ι [ι ]1,hp2 = η2[g1]1+ ι [d]1) and,
H =hash(hk,(pk, [m]1), [C]1) = (η1+ξη2)[u1]1+θ [u2]1+µ([e]1− [m]1)+ ι [v]1
=r[hp1]1+ rξ [hp2]1 = projhash(hp,(pk, [m]1), [C]1,r) = pH.
2.8. Registered and Bare Public Key Model.
In the registered public key (RPK, [19]) model, it is assumed that each partyPid
trusts some key-registration authority Rid and has registered her key with Rid .
(The same Rid can be used by several parties, or each party can decide to trust a
separate authority.) IfPid is honest, then the secret key exists and the public key
comes from correct distribution (in this case, the public key is said to be “safe”). If
Pid is dishonest, the secret key still exists (and the public key has been computed
from it honestly) but there is no guarantee about its distribution (in this case, the
public key is said to be “well-formed”).
Different variants (most importantly, the “traditional proof-of-knowledge” ver-
sion where the secret key and the public key are generated byPid who then sends
the public key to Rid and proves the knowledge of the secret key to Rid by using
a stand-alone zero-knowledge proof) of the RPK model are known. We assume
that each party knows the identities of all other parties and their key-registration
authorities, see [19] for discussion.
In the Bare Public Key (BPK) model [54, 120], parties have access to a public
file F , a polynomial-size collection of records (id,pkid), where id is a string iden-
tifying a party (e.g., a verifier), and pkid is her (alleged) public key. In a typical
zero-knowledge protocol in the BPK model, a key-owning party Pid works in
two stages. In stage one (the key-generation stage), on input a security parameter
1λ and randomizer r, Pid outputs a public key pkid and stores the correspond-
ing secret key skid . We assume the no-auxiliary-string BPK model where from
this it follows thatPid actually created pkid . After that, F will include (id,pkid).
In stage two, each party has access to F , while Pid has possibly access to skid
(however, the latter is not required by us). It is commonly assumed that only the
verifier of a NIZK argument system in the BPK model has a public key [120].
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2.9. Generic Model
In the Generic Bilinear Group Model (GBGM) [35, 118, 124, 131], one assumes
that the adversary has only access to group elements via generic bilinear-group op-
erations (group operations and the bilinear map) together with an equality test. In
the subversion GBGM (Sub-GBGM, [9, 22, 43, 132]; named generic group model
with hashing into the group in [22]), the adversary has an additional power of
creating new random group elements. The Sub-GBGM is motivated by known
elliptic curve hashing algorithms [42, 99, 133] that allow one to efficiently create
elliptic-curve group elements without knowing their discrete logarithm.
Hence, Sub-GBGM is a weaker model than GBGM. As an important example,
knowledge assumptions that state that the output group element must belong to
the span of input group elements hold in the GBGM but not in the Sub-GBGM.
This is since, in the Sub-GBGM, the adversary can create new group elements
without knowing their discrete logarithms; indeed the output element might be
equal to one such created group elements. Thus, a Sub-GBGM adversary is less
restricted than a GBGM adversary. See [9] for a longer introduction to GBGM
and Sub-GBGM.
2.10. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge
Let RGen be a relation generator, such that RGen(1λ ) outputs a polynomial time
decidable binary relation R = {(x,w)}. Here, x and w are respectively the state-
ment and the witness. The generator RGen also returns some auxiliary informa-
tion auxR that is public for the adversary and the honest parties. Let LR = {x :
∃w,(x,w) ∈R} be an NP-language. NIZK proofs in the CRS model consists of
the four algorithms (K,P,V,Sim) where K, P, V, and Sim are common reference
strings (CRS) generator, prover, verifier, and the simulator, respectively. A NIZK
must provide the following properties: (i) completeness (for all CRS crs generated
by K and (x,w) ∈R, we have that V(crs,x,P(crs,x,w)) = 1), (ii) zero-knowledge
(there exists a simulator Sim that returns a simulated proof such that it is distin-
guishable from proofs computed by P(crs,x,w)), and (iii) soundness (an adversary
cannot output a proof pi and an instance x 6∈LR such that V(crs,x,pi) = 1. More-
over, the knowledge soundness property goes further and says that for any prover
P generating a valid proof there is an extractor Ext that can extract a valid witness
w.
2.11. zk-SNARKs
2.11.1. Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP) was introduced by Gennaro et al. [82] as
a language L where for a witness w and input x, predicate (x,w) ∈ R can be
verified with a parallel quadratic checking; and it also has an efficient reduction
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from the language (either Boolean or Arithmetic) CIRCUIT-SAT. Therefore, an
efficient zk-SNARK for QAP results in an efficient zk-SNARK for CIRCUIT-
SAT.
Let m be the number of wires and n be the number of multiplication gates in
an arithmetic circuit. Similarly to [82], we assume arithmetic circuits that consist
only of fan-in-2 multiplication gates, where either input of each multiplication
gate is a weighted sum of some wire values.
Let F= Zp, such that ω is the nth primitive root of unity modulo p.
An QAP instance Q is specified by (Zp,m0,{u j,v j,w j}mj=1), where u j(X) =
n
∑
i=1
Ui j`i(X), v j(X) =
n
∑
i=1
Vi j`i(X), and w j(X) =
n
∑
i=1
Wi j`i(X) are polynomials from
Zp[X ] with degree d ≤ (n−1). Here, U,V,W ∈ Zn×mp are public sparse matrices.
The instanceQ defines the following relation:
RQ =
{
(x,w) : x = (A1, . . . ,Am0)
>∧w = (Am0+1, . . . ,Am)>∧
(∑mj=1 A ju j(X))(∑
m
j=1 A jv j(X))≡ ∑mj=1 A jw j(X) (mod `(X))
}
.
Alternatively, (x,w) ∈R if there exists a degree-≤ (n−2) polynomial h(X), s.t.
(∑mj=1 A ju j(X))(∑
m
j=1 A jv j(X))−∑mj=1 A jw j(X) = h(X)`(X) .
2.11.2. Definitions: zk-SNARKs
Now we recall a formal description of zk-SNARKs and their security properties.
As in [94], we assume that the relation generator RGen also returns auxiliary
information auxR that equals p← Pgen(1λ ). So, we give auxR as an input to all
parties (including honest or adversarial).
LetLR = {x : ∃w s.t. |w|= poly (|x|),(x,w)∈R} be an NP-language. Let z˜R
be a common auxiliary information that is generated by using a relation generator
RGen [31]. A NIZK system Ψ for RGen consists of four PPT algorithms:
CRS generator K: a probabilistic algorithm that, given z˜R ∈ range(RGen(1λ ))
outputs a CRS trapdoor td and a CRS crs. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Prover P: a probabilistic algorithm that, given (z˜R ,crs,x,w), outputs an argu-
ment pi if (x,w) ∈R. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Verifier V: a probabilistic algorithm that, given (z˜R ,crs,x,pi), returns either 0
(reject) or 1 (accept).
Simulator Sim: a probabilistic algorithm that, given (z˜R ,crs, td,x) outputs an
argument pi . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Definition 11 (SNARK). A non-interactive systemΨ is a succinct non-interactive
argument of knowledge (SNARK) for relation generator RGen if it is complete and
knowledge sound, and moreover succinct, meaning that for all λ , all (R,auxR)∈
im(RGen(1λ )), all crs←K(z˜R), all (x,w)∈R and all proofs pi←P(z˜R ,crs,x,w)
we have |pi|= poly(λ ) and V(z˜R ,crs,x,pi) runs in time polynomial in λ + |x|.
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A NIZK argument Ψ must satisfy the following properties:
(i) Completeness. For any λ , and (x,w) ∈Rρ ,
Pr
[
(crs, td)← K(z˜R) : V(z˜R ,crs,x,P(z˜R ,crs,x,w)) = 1
]
= 1 .
(ii) Statistical Zero-Knowledge. For any computationally unbounded adver-
sary A , |εzk0 − εzk1 | ≈λ 0, where εzkb :=
Pr
[
(crs, ts)← K(z˜R),b←${0,1} :A Ob(·,·)(z˜R ,crs) = 1
]
.
The oracle O0(x,w) returns⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈Rρ , and otherwise it returns
P(z˜R ,crs,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ , and
otherwise it returns Sim(z˜R ,crs, td,x).
(iii) Computational Soundness. For any non-uniform PPT A ,
Pr
[
(crs, td)← K(z˜R);(x,pi)←A (z˜R ,crs) :
V(z˜R ,crs,x,pi) = 1∧¬(∃w : (x,w) ∈Rρ)
]
≈λ 0 .
In zk-SNARK constructions, Ψ needs to satisfy a strong definition of the com-
putational soundness called computationally knowledge-soundness [94], if for all
non-uniform PPT A , there is a non-uniform PPT extractor ExtA ,
Pr
(crs, td)← K(z˜R);r←$ RNDλ (A ),(x,pi)←A (z˜R ,crs;r),w← ExtA (z˜R ,crs;r) :
(x,w) 6∈R ∧V(z˜R ,crs,x,pi) = 1
≈λ 0 .
Next we recall some addition (strong) properties of NIZKs.
Definition 12 (Statistically Composable Zero-Knowledge [95]). Ψ is statistically
composable zero-knowledge (ZK) for RGen, if for all (x,w) ∈R and all compu-
tationally unbounded A , εcomp0 ≈λ εcomp1 , where
εcompb = Pr
(crs, td)← K(z˜R),if b = 0 then pi ← P(z˜R ,crs,x,w)
else pi ← Sim(z˜R ,crs, td,x) fi :A (z˜R ,crs, td,pi) = 1
 .
Ψ is perfectly composable ZK for RGen if one requires that εcomp0 = ε
comp
1 .
The adversary A in composable ZK definition only can see an argument pi
(either real or simulated pi) and is not allowed to make many queries to the ora-
cle (as in the case of the following unbounded ZK). Next, we recall statistically
unbounded ZK [90]. 6
6Notice that Unbounded ZK was not defined in [90], presumably because it is a corollary of
composable ZK as it is shown in [90].
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Definition 13 (Statistically Unbounded ZK [91]). Ψ is statistically unbounded
ZK for RGen, if for all computationally unbounded A , εunb0 ≈λ εunb1 , where
εunbb = Pr[(crs, td)← K(z˜R) :A Ob(·,·)(z˜R ,crs) = 1] .
Here, the oracle O0(x,w) returns⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈R, and otherwise it returns
P(z˜R ,crs,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ R, and other-
wise it returns Sim(z˜R ,crs, td,x). Ψ is perfectly unbounded ZK for RGen if one
requires that εunb0 = ε
unb
1 .
From [90], it is known that composable ZK is a stronger requirement than
unbounded ZK since in the case of composable ZK, (i) the adversary gets access
to td, and (ii) the simulated CRS was required to be indistinguishable from the
real CRS.
Groth’s SNARK construction [94]. We recall the construction of the most effi-
cient zk-SNARK proposed by Groth [94] in Fig. 1.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 2 of [94]). The construction in Fig. 1 is perfectly complete,
perfect zero-knowledge and statistically knowledge sound.
2.12. Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments
We recall the definition of QA-NIZK arguments of Jutla and Roy [100]. A QA-
NIZK proof system provides proof for membership of words x in accordance with
witnesses w in a languageLρ defined by a relation Rρ which is parametrized by
some language parameter lpar := ρ chosen from a distribution Dp. The distri-
bution Dp is witness samplable if there exists an efficient algorithm that samples
(ρ, tdρ) where tdρ is a secret value associated to ρ , so that the parameter ρ is
distributed according to Dp. The membership of the language parameter ρ can
be efficiently verified with the trapdoor tdρ . The CRS of QA-NIZKs depends on
a language parameter ρ and as mentioned in [100], it has to be chosen from a
correct distribution Dp.
A tuple of PPT algorithms Π= (KGen,P,V,Sim) is a QA-NIZK argument in
the CRS model for a set of witness-relations Rp = {Rρ}ρ∈Supp(Dp ) with ρ sam-
pled from a distributionDp over associated parameter languageLp, if the follow-
ing properties (i-iii) hold. Here, KGen is the parameter and the CRS generation
algorithm, more precisely, KGen consists of two algorithms Pgen (generates the
parameter p) and K (generates the CRS), P is the prover, V is the verifier, and Sim
is the simulator.
(i) Completeness. For any λ , and (x,w) ∈Rρ ,
Pr
p← Pgen(1
λ );ρ←$Dp;
(crs, td)← K(ρ);pi ← P(ρ,crs,x,w) :
V(ρ,crs,x,pi) = 1
= 1 .
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K(z˜R): sample td = (χ,α,β ,γ,δ )←$(Z∗p)5. For j ∈ [m], set u j(χ) ←
n
∑
i=1
Ui jχ i ,
v j(χ)←
n
∑
i=1
Vi jχ i, w j(χ)←
n
∑
i=1
Wi jχ i;
compute
crs←
(
[α,β ,δ ,(χ i)n−1i=0 ,((u j(χ)β + v j(χ)α+w j(χ))/δ )
m
j=m0+1
,(χ i`(χ)/δ )n−2i=0 ]1,
[((u j(χ)β + v j(χ)α+w j(χ))/γ)m0j=1]1, [β ,γ,δ ,(χ
i)n−1i=0 ]2
)
,
return (crs, ts).
P(z˜R ,crs,x = (A j)
m0
j=1,w = (A j)
m
j=m0+1): a
†(X) ←
m
∑
j=1
A ju j(X); b†(X) ←
m
∑
j=1
A jv j(X); c†(X)←
m
∑
j=1
A jw j(X);
h(X) =
n−2
∑
i=0
hiX i← (a†(X)b†(X)− c†(X))/`(X); ra←$Zp; rb←$Zp;
[h(χ)`(χ)/δ ]1←
n−2
∑
i=0
hi[χ i`(χ)/δ ]1;
[a]1←
m
∑
j=1
A j[u j(χ)]1+[α]1+ ra[δ ]1;
[b]2←
m
∑
j=1
A j[v j(χ)]2+[β ]2+ rb[δ ]2;
[c]1← rb[a]1 + ra
(
∑mj=1 A j[v j(χ)]1+[β ]1
)
+∑mj=m0+1 A j[(u j(χ)β + v j(χ)α+
w j(χ))/δ ]1+[h(χ)`(χ)/δ ]1;
return pi ← ([a]1, [b]2, [c]1).
V(z˜R ,crs,x = (A j)
m0
j=1,pi = ([a]1, [b]2, [c]1)):
check [a]1[b]2
?
= [c]1[δ ]2 + (∑m0j=1 A j[(u j(χ)β + v j(χ)α + w j(χ))/γ]1)[γ]2 +
[α]1[β ]2.
Figure 1. Groth’s SNARK [94].
(ii) Statistical Zero-Knowledge. For any computationally unbounded adver-
sary A , |εzk0 − εzk1 | ≈λ 0, where εzkb :=
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );ρ←$Dp;(crs, td)← K(ρ);b←${0,1} :
A Ob(·,·)(ρ,crs) = 1
]
.
The oracle O0(x,w) returns⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈Rρ , and otherwise it returns
P(ρ,crs,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ , and
otherwise it returns Sim(ρ,crs, td,x).
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K(ρ := [M]1 ∈Gn×m1 ): A←$Dˆk; K←$Zn×kˆp ; C ← KA ∈ Zn×kp ; [P]1 ←
[M]>1 K ∈ Zm×kˆp ; crs← ([A,C]2, [P]1); td← K;
return (td,crs).
P([M]1,crs, [y]1,w): [pi]1← [P]>1 w ∈Gkˆ1.
V([M]1,crs, [y]1, [pi]1): - if [y]>1 [C]2 = [pi]
>
1 [A]2 return 1 else return 0.
Sim([M]1,crs, td, [y]1): [pi]1← K>[y]1 ∈Gkˆ1.
Figure 2. Kiltz-Wee QA-NIZK Πas (kˆ = k+ 1 and Dˆk = Dk) and Π′as (kˆ = k and Dˆk =
D¯k) [106].
(iii) Computational Soundness. For any PPT A ,
Pr
p← Pgen(1
λ );ρ←$Dp;(crs, td)← K(ρ);
(x,pi)←A (ρ,crs) :
V(ρ,crs,x,pi) = 1∧¬(∃w : (x,w) ∈Rρ)
≈λ 0 .
Kiltz-Wee’s QA-NIZK Argument for Linear Spaces [106]. In this part we
recall the most efficient constructions of QA-NIZK arguments of membership in
linear spaces given by Kiltz and Wee [106] for the language
L[M]1 =
{
[y]1 ∈Gn1 : ∃w ∈ Zmp s.t. y = Mw
}
,
where ρ = [M]1 ∈Gn×m1 . The corresponding relation is defined asR[M]1 = {([y]1,w)∈
Gn1×Zmp : y = Mw}. This language is useful in many applications (cf. [100] and
follow up work). We recall the full construction of the Kiltz-Wee QA-NIZK argu-
ments for linear subspaces in the CRS model in Fig. 2. Let Dk be the distribution
is defined Definition 3. Let D¯k be taken as the uniform distribution over a set of
all matrices in Zk×kp .
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 of [106]). If Dˆk = Dk and kˆ = k+ 1, Fig. 2 describes
a QA-NIZK proof system Πas with perfect completeness, computational adaptive
soundness based on the Dk-KerMDH assumption, perfect zero-knowledge, and
proof size k+1.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 of [106]). If Dˆk = D¯k, kˆ = k, the, and Dp is a witness
samplable distribution, Fig. 2 describes a QA-NIZK proof system Πas with per-
fect completeness, computational adaptive soundness based on the Dk-KerMDH
assumption, perfect zero-knowledge, and proof size k.
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3. NIZKS WITH SUBVERTED SETUP
General Motivation for Subversion NIZKs. Zero-knowledge proofs were intro-
duced by Goldwasser et al. [86]. A zero-knowledge proof is a protocol between a
prover and a verifier that allows the prover to convince the verifier of the validity of
a statement without revealing any more information. Zero-knowledge proofs and
in particular non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) are a critical prim-
itive for building cryptographic protocols as they allow to have the correctness
of some computations while valuing the privacy of the user. They play a piv-
otal role in both the practice and theory of cryptography and increasingly found
their way into real-world applications. Some important applications are anony-
mous credentials [21, 46–49, 55, 78], electronic voting [63, 93, 129], and group
signatures [18, 36, 37, 56, 66, 67]. In addition they are a core of verifiable com-
putation [38, 81, 82, 126] and smart contracts [108]. Nowadays the use of some
efficient NIZKs gets more attentions in real-world applications, more precisely in
some systems such as Zcash [130] and Ethereum [44].
For the practical applications of NIZKs in the CRS model, an important issue
is a need for trust in the generation of the CRS. In theory, one may simply as-
sume that the CRS comes from some trusted party, but indeed in the real-word
applications such a party is troublesome to implement. Recently, there has been
an increasing interest to diminish trust in the generator of the CRS. One of this
line of works is subversion zero-knowledge initiated by Bellare et al. in [22],
where the zero-knowledge property even holds when the CRS is generated mali-
ciously. They established several positive and negative results. More accurately,
they proved that it is impossible to achieve simultaneously subversion soundness
and zero-knowledge (even non-subversion). While subversion zero-knowledge
(Sub-ZK) can be achieved. Following this initial work, in this chapter we inves-
tigate subversion version of two variants of NIZKs called zk-SNARK and QA-
NIZK (respectively the results are published in [9] and [11]); and explain the
intuition of constructing the Sub-ZK of the most efficient SNARKs [94] in Sec-
tion 3.1, and the Sub-ZK of the most efficient QA-NIZK [106] in Section 3.5.
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3.1. Subversion-Secure zk-SNARK
Motivation. As noted before, an important aspect of practical applications of zk-
SNARKs is the challenge of the need of a trust for generating CRS. One way to
deal with such an issue is to use the security notation of Bellare et al. [22] called
subversion zero-knowledge where one can achieve zero-knowledge even when the
CRS is subverted. Implementing this security notion signifies that the prover is
not required to trust the CRS generator and so it diminishes the trust of one party
in such systems. Following this idea, we investigate subversion zero-knowledge
property of the most efficient zk-SNARKs [94].
3.2. Previous Works
The first NIZK with fast verification and small proof sizes (whose size is indepen-
dent of its witness and the proven statement) was proposed by Groth [92] based
on bilinear groups. Later it was improved by Lipmaa [113]. Gennaro et al [82]
explicated how one can efficiently convert any boolean circuit into a Quadratic
Span Program (QSP), and proposed a SNARK for QSPs whose proof is 8 group
elements. They also proposed another construction based on quadratic arithmetic
programs (QAP) 1. In practice, usually QAP based constructions are more effi-
cient and preferred. Later Parno et al. [126] modified the SNARK construction of
Gennaro et al [82] by reducing the proof size by one group element and called it
Pinocchio. The proof size of SNARK for boolean circuits was notably optimized
by Danezis et al [64], by moving from QSP to square span programs (SSP), and
constructed a system with the proof size contains only 4 group elements. Recently,
Groth [94] finally proposed the most efficient SNARK, which is for QAP based
arithmetic circuits and its proof contains only 3 group elements (and requires 3
pairings in verification phase).
3.3. Problem Statement
What are the requirements to have the most efficient zk-SNARK, Groth’s zk-
SNARK [94] in a subverted setup (when the CRS is maliciously generated) ?.
More precisely, can we construct a subversion version of Groth’s zk-SNARK [94]
while it still remains succinct? What would be the complexity of the prover and
the verifier of subversion version of Groth’s zk-SNARK? What is the cost of hav-
ing the subversion zero-knowledge property for such a construction?
1In QAPs, the inputs of the gates of the arithmetic circuits are elements from a finite field F
and so the gates multiply or add field elements. Also since the circuit satisfiability is NP-complete,
SNARKs cover all NP languages.
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3.4. Our Solution
Following the result of Bellare et al. [22] (the existence of Sub-ZK of NIZKs), we
start with defining Sub-zk-SNARKs and their new security characteristics. Then
in order to achieve Sub-ZK, we define a new algorithm CV for checking whether
the CRS is well-formed. We implement the new security properties and the al-
gorithm CV for Groth’s zk-SNARK [94] by modifying its CRS and defining the
corresponding algorithm CV that checks the well-formness of the new CRS. More
accurately, we investigate the new security definitions for Groth’s zk-SNARK [94]
with the following steps: (i) add some new elements in the CRS to make it pub-
licly verifiable and trapdoor extractable, (ii) introduce a new algorithm CV which
takes the modified CRS and checks whether it is well-formed, (iii) define the fol-
lowing new security definitions for Sub-zk-SNARK, perfect subversion-complete
(this comprises the requirement that the CRS verification accepts an honestly gen-
erated CRS), computationally knowledge-sound, and composable (or statistically
unbounded) Sub-zk SNARKs, (iv) prove that the Sub-ZK version of Groth’s zk-
SNARK [94] provides the aforementioned security characteristics. A full descrip-
tion of our construction of Sub-zk-SNARK is provided in the paper [9], which is
joint work with Baghery, Lipmaa, and Zajac.
3.4.1. New Algorithm: CRS Verification CV
When we are operating on a subverted setup where the CRS is generated ma-
liciously, the need for an algorithm confirming that the CRS is well-formed is
crucial. More precisely in NIZKs (i.e, SNARKs) setting, before generating the
proof, an honest prover P needs at least to validate the correctness of the CRS.
In other words, one requires that the proof generated by an honest prover P with
the subverted CRS will not disclose any information about her witness (Sub-ZK
property). Therefore to preserve zero-knowledge in subverted setup, the existence
of efficient CRS verification algorithm CV is vital.
For the sake of clarity, we assume that CV is a separate algorithm and not a
part of P algorithm. So that, an honest prover first checks the CRS by running
the CV algorithm, if it accepts then runs the P algorithm. Such separation also
is valuable in practice where one uses the same CRS and executes many zero-
knowledge arguments; it makes sense that the prover only executes CV once. We
perceive that an honest verifier does not necessitate to run the CRS verification
algorithm since we are not aiming to deliver subversion (knowledge-)soundness.
Thus a subversion-resistant NIZK argument system Ψ for the relation R con-
sists of the following five PPT algorithms K, P, V, Sim, and CV. The first four
algorithms are similar to the ones in NIZK argument systems presented in Sec-
tion 2.11.2. But the last one is a new algorithm that takes crs as input and outputs
1 if it is well-formed; otherwise outputs 0.
In the next subsection we use such CV algorithm to define the new security
properties of Sub-zk-SNARKs.
40
3.4.2. Security Definition of Sub-zk-SNARK
In general, a Sub-zk-SNARK must provide the following security definitions: per-
fect subversion-completeness (a legitimate prover convinces a legitimate verifier,
and an honestly generated CRS passes the CRS verification CV) computational
knowledge-soundness (if a prover convinces a legitimate verifier, then he must
know the corresponding witness), and statistical Sub-ZK (given a possibly sub-
verted CRS, a proof generated by the legitimate prover exposes no side informa-
tion). We note that in Sub-ZK definition we acknowledge the existence of efficient
subverter and a computationally unbounded distinguisher. Furthermore, we con-
sider the case when the subverter is unbounded and call it statistically unbounded
Sub-ZK. In addition, following the definition of statistical composable ZK [91]
(ZK is guaranteed against an adversary who has to distinguish a single argument
from a simulated one), we define a stronger version of statistical Sub-ZK called
statistical composable Sub-ZK.
We define the security definitions of Sub-ZK SNARK based non subversion-
resistant security definitions from [91,95]. For the sake of simplicity, we emphasize
the differences between subversion and non-subversion definitions. Similarly to
non-subversion definitions mentioned in Section 2.11.2, we let all legitimate par-
ties obtain auxR as an input. We split the CRS generation K algorithm into the fol-
lowing three algorithms, Ktd, Ktds, and Kcrs where respectively output the CRS’s
trapdoor td, the simulation trapdoor tds, and the CRS crs.2 Additionally, we split
the CRS into three parts indicating crs = (crsP,crsV,crsCV) where crsP (resp.,
crsV) is the part of the CRS given to a legitimate prover (resp., a legitimate veri-
fier), and crsCV is the part of CRS not required by the prover or the verifier except
to run CV algorithm. Such splitting does not influence the security proof but in
many instances, crsV is significantly shorter than crsP.
Definition 14 (Perfect Subversion-Completeness). A non-interactive argument Ψ
is perfectly subversion-complete for RGen, if for all λ , (x,w) ∈R, (R,auxR) ∈
range(RGen(1λ )), and td ∈ range(Ktd(R,auxR))\{⊥},
Pr
[
crs← Kcrs(R,auxR , td) : CV(R,auxR ,crs) = 1∧
V(R,auxR ,crsV,x,P(R,auxR ,crsP,x,w)) = 1
]
= 1 .
Definition 15 (Computational Knowledge-Soundness [95]). Ψ is computationally
(adaptively) knowledge-sound for RGen, if for every non-uniform PPT A , there
exists a non-uniform PPT extractor ExtA ,
Pr
(R,auxR)← RGen(1
λ ),(crs‖tds)← K(R,auxR),
r←$ RNDλ (A ),((x,pi)‖w)← (A ‖ExtA )(R,auxR ,crs;r) :
(x,w) 6∈R ∧V(R,auxR ,crsV,x,pi) = 1
≈λ 0 .
2Intuitively Groth’s CRS generation algorithm returns Kcrs(R,auxR ,Ktd(R,auxR)) as the
CRS and Ktds(R,auxR ,Ktd(R,auxR)) as the simulation trapdoor
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Where, auxR can be viewed as a common auxiliary input to A and ExtA
that is generated by using a benign [32] relation generator (auxR could be the
description of a secure bilinear group). A knowledge-sound argument system is
called an argument of knowledge.
Next, we define statistically unbounded Sub-ZK such that in contrast to statis-
tically unbounded ZK [90], the CRS crs is generated by a subverter Z who also
returns auxZ. Besides, the adversary A has access to auxZ meaning that A can
cooperate with Z. Also, the extractor ExtZ can extract td from Z, and it will be
used to compute the simulation trapdoor tds that is then given as an auxiliary
input to A and the oracle O1.
Definition 16 (Statistically Unbounded Sub-ZK). Ψ is statistically unbounded
Sub-ZK for RGen, if for any PPT subverter Z there exists a PPT ExtZ, such
that for all (R,auxR) ∈ range(RGen(1λ )) and all computationally unbounded
A , εunb0 ≈λ εunb1 , where εunbb is defined as
Pr
r←$ RNDλ (Z),(crs,auxZ ‖ td)← (Z‖ExtZ)(R,auxR ;r),tds← Ktds(R,auxR , td) : CV(R,auxR ,crs) = 1∧
A Ob(·,·)(R,auxR ,crs, tds,auxZ ) = 1
 .
Here, the oracle O0(x,w) returns⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈R, and otherwise it returns
P(R,auxR ,crsP,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ R, and
otherwise it returns Sim(R,auxR ,crs,tds,x). Ψ is perfectly unbounded Sub-ZK
for RGen if one requires that εunb0 = ε
unb
1 .
Finally, we define statistical composable Sub-ZK based on the definition of
(computational) composable ZK from [90] but with some fundamental differ-
ences. More accurately, [91] defined the two properties: (i) reference string in-
distinguishability, meaning that the CRS created by a valid K is indistinguishable
with the one simulated by a simulator Simcrs, and (ii) simulation indistinguisha-
bility meaning that the proof created by a legitimate prover P should be indistin-
guishable with the one simulated by a simulator Sim.
In Sub-ZK case, since the CRS created by a subverter Z (in both the real and
the simulated cases), therefore our statistical composable Sub-ZK is analogous to
the definition of simulation indistinguishability but instead of simulating the CRS,
we use the CRS crs generated by Z, assume that an extractor ExtZ extracts td from
crs, calculate tds from td by using Ktds, and finally check that CV accepts crs.
Definition 17 (Statistically Composable Sub-ZK). Ψ is statistically composable
Sub-ZK for RGen, if for any PPT subverter Z there exists a PPT ExtZ, such that
for all (R,auxR) ∈ range(RGen(1λ )), all (x,w) ∈ R, and all computationally
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/ i = 1
[ζ ]T ← ([χ]1 [χn−1]2− [1]T )/n; [ω ′]2← [1]2;
if [χ]2 =
[
ω ′
]
2 then check [a1]1 = [1]1;
else check [a1]1([χ]2− [ω ′]2) =? [ζ ]T ;
for i = 2 to n do
[ζ ]T ← ω[ζ ]T ; [ω ′]2← ω[ω ′]2;
if [χ]2 =
[
ω ′
]
2 then check [ai]1 =
? [1]1;
else check [ai]1([χ]2− [ω ′]2) =? [ζ ]T ;endfor
Figure 3. The algorithm checkLag([χ,(ai)ni=1]1, [1,χ,χ
n−1]2, [1]T ) for checking that
[ai]1 = [`i(χ)]1 for i ∈ [n].
unbounded A , εcomp0 ≈λ εcomp1 , where εcompb is defined as
Pr

r←$ RNDλ (Z),(crs,auxZ ‖ td)← (Z‖ExtZ)(R,auxR ;r),
tds← Ktds(R,auxR , td), if b = 0 then pi ← P(R,auxR ,crsP,x,w)
else pi ← Sim(R,auxR ,crs,tds,x) fi :
CV(R,auxR ,crs) = 1∧A (R,auxR ,crs,tds,pi ,auxZ ) = 1
 .
Ψ is perfectly composable Sub-ZK for RGen if one requires that εcomp0 = ε
comp
1 .
We note that in contrast to the definition of composable (non-Sub) ZK in [95],
in composable Sub-ZK the CRS crs is created by a subverter Z who also returns
auxZ. Besides, the adversaryA has access to auxZ meaning thatA can cooperate
with Z. Also the extractor ExtZ can extract td from Z, and it will be used to
compute the simulation trapdoor tds that is then given as an auxiliary input toA .
(i) first split the CRS generation algorithm into the three algorithms, Ktd, Ktds,
and Kcrs. intuitively the CRS generation algorithm of Groth’s zk-SNARK [94] re-
turns Kcrs(R,auxR ,Ktd(R,auxR)) as the CRS and Ktds(R,auxR ,Ktd(R,auxR))
as the simulation trapdoor, (ii) next add to the CRS 2n+3 new elements (see the
variable crsCV in Fig. 4) that are needed for CV algorithm to work efficiently. Also
for sake of simplicity, we split the CRS crs = (crsP,crsV,crsCV), where the crsCV
carries the new elements added in the CRS. (iii) then describe an efficient CRS
verification algorithm CV (see Fig. 4), and (iv) replace Groth’s CRS generation
algorithm with the CRS generation algorithms, Ktd, Ktds, and Kcrs; and attach the
CV algorithm as a new algorithm to Groth’s zk-SNARK [94].
3.4.3. Sub-zk-SNARK Construction
In this part, we implement the aforementioned CRS verification algorithm CV for
the most efficient zk-SNARK [94]. We give a concrete construction of Sub-ZK
version of zk-SNARK [94] and depict the full construction in Fig. 4. In particular,
we modify Groth’s zk-SNARK [94] with the following steps:
Note that for the performance of CV algorithm, we add the Lagrange polyno-
mials `i(.) evaluated in the trapdoor χ in the CRS. See Fig. 5 for the procedure
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Ktd(R,auxR): Generate td = (χ,α,β ,γ,δ )←$Z3p× (Z∗p)2.
Ktds(R,auxR , td): Set tds← (χ,α,β ,δ ).
Kcrs(R,auxR , td): Compute (`i(χ))ni=1 by using the algorithm in Fig. 5. Set u j(χ)←
n
∑
i=1
Ui j`i(χ) , v j(χ)←
n
∑
i=1
Vi j`i(χ), w j(χ)←
n
∑
i=1
Wi j`i(χ) for all j ∈ [m]. Let
crsP←

[
α,β ,δ ,
(
u j(χ)β+v j(χ)α+w j(χ)
δ
)m
j=m0+1
]
1
,[
(χ i`(χ)/δ )n−2i=0 ,(u j(χ),v j(χ))
m
j=0
]
1
,
[
β ,δ ,(v j(χ))mj=0
]
2
 ,
crsV←
([(
u j(χ)β+v j(χ)α+w j(χ)
γ
)m0
j=0
]
1
, [γ,δ ]2 , [αβ ]T
)
,
crsCV←
(
[γ,(χ i)n−1i=1 ,(`i(χ))
n
i=1]1, [α,χ,χ
n−1]2
)
.
Return crs← (crsCV,crsP,crsV).
K(R,auxR): let td← Ktd(R,auxR).
Return (crs‖tds)← (Kcrs ‖Ktds)(R,auxR , td).
CV(R,auxR ,crs):
1. For ι ∈ {γ,δ}: check that [ι ]1 6= [0]1
2. For ι ∈ {α,β ,γ,δ}: check that [ι ]1 [1]2 = [1]1 [ι ]2,
3. For i = 1 to n−1: check that [χ i]1 [1]2 = [χ i−1]1 [χ]2,
4. Check that ([`i(χ)]1)
n
i=1 is correctly computed by using the algorithm
in Fig. 3,
5. For j = 0 to m:
(a) Check that [u j(χ)]1 =
n
∑
i=1
Ui j [`i(χ)]1,
(b) Check that [v j(χ)]1 =
n
∑
i=1
Vi j [`i(χ)]1,
(c) Set [w j(χ)]1←
n
∑
i=1
Wi j [`i(χ)]1,
(d) Check that [v j(χ)]1 [1]2 = [1]1 [v j(χ)]2,
6. For j = m0 +1 to m: check that [(u j(χ)β + v j(χ)α+w j(χ))/δ ]1 [δ ]2 =
[u j(χ)]1 [β ]2+[v j(χ)]1 [α]2+[w j(χ)]1 [1]2,
7. Check that
[
χn−1
]
1 [1]2 = [1]1
[
χn−1
]
2,
8. For i = 0 to n− 2: check that [χ i`(χ)/δ]1 [δ ]2 = [χ i+1]1 [χn−1]2 −[
χ i
]
1 [1]2,
9. Check that [α]1 [β ]2 = [αβ ]T .
P(R,auxR ,crsP,x = (A1, . . . ,Am0),w = (Am0+1, . . . ,Am)): Works similar to the one of
Groth’s SNARK [94].
V(R,auxR ,crsV,x = (A1, . . . ,Am0),pi = ([a]1, [b]2, [c]1)): Works similar to the one of
Groth’s SNARK [94].
Figure 4. The full construction of Sub-zk-SNARK.
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ζ ← (χn−1)/n;ω ′← 1;
if χ = ω ′ then `1(χ)← 1;else `1(χ)← ζ/(χ−ω ′);fi
for i = 2 to n do
ζ ← ωζ ;ω ′← ωω ′;
if χ = ω ′ then `i(χ)← 1; else `i(χ)← ζ/(χ−ω ′);fi endfor
Figure 5. The algorithm compLag(χ,n) for computing (`i(χ))ni=1
of the Lagrange generation algorithm. Thus one can efficiency check the well-
formness of the polynomials u j(χ), v j(χ), and w j(χ) of QAPs instance in CV
algorithm.
3.4.4. Efficiency of Sub-zk-SNARK
In this section we investigate the performance of Sub-zk-SNARK. As presented
earlier, we added some new elements in different groups to the CRS of [94] to
make it publicly verifiable (by executing CV algorithm). We describe the CRS
length of Sub-zk-SNARK with more details in Table 1. The total size of the CRS
contains 4m+3n+13 group elements.3
We recall that the CRS of Groth’s zk-SNARK [95] consists of m+ 2n and n
elements respectively in G1 and G2.
Computational complexity of CRS generation. Suppose gk has been already
computed. We create crs by first generating the discrete logarithms of all CRS
elements, and then their versions in Gι for ι ∈ {1,2}. One can evaluate u j(χ),
v j(χ), and w j(χ) for each j ∈ [m] in time Θ(n) by using precomputed values
`i(χ) for i ∈ [n] and the fact that the matrices U,V,W contain Θ(n) non-zero el-
ements. (The latter is a standard assumption, already made in [82].) The rest
of the CRS can be created efficiently by using straightforward algorithms. By
counting the compLag algorithm in Fig. 5, the whole CRS generation algorithm
is dominated by 3m+ 2n+ 3 exponentiations in G1, m+ 5 exponentiations in
G2, 1 exponentiation in GT (thus, one exponentiation per each CRS element),
and Θ(n) multiplications/divisions in Zp. Thus based on Fig. 5, the whole CRS
generation algorithm is dominated by 3m+ 3n+ 5 exponentiations in G1, m+ 7
exponentiations in G2, and 1 exponentiation in GT (one per CRS element) and
Θ(n) multiplications/divisions in Zp.
CV’s computational complexity. Suppose subverting gk is difficult; this holds
by assuming that the SNARKs use well-known bilinear groups (i.e, the Barreto-
Naehrig curves). In the the CRS verification algorithm in Fig. 4, we observe that
all steps but step 4 can be efficiently computed in Θ(n) cryptographic operations.
3One element (namely, [δ ]2) is both in crsV and crsP, and so the numbers in the total row are
not equal to the sum of the numbers in previous rows.
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G1 G2 GT Total
crsP 3m+n−m0+4 m+3 0 4m+n−m0+7
crsV m0+1 2 1 m0+4
crsCV 2n 3 0 2n+3
Total 3m+3n+5 m+7 1 4m+3n+13
Table 1. The CRS length of Sub-zk-SNARK.
More precisely its computation needs 6m+ 5n− 4m0 + 8 pairings. Besides, one
needs to compute s(U)+ s(V )+ s(W ) exponentiations in G1, where s(M) is the
number of “large” (i.e., large enough so that exponentiating with them is expen-
sive) entries in the matrix M. Often, s(M) are very small.
For the algorithm step 4, one needs n−1 exponentiations in G2, n exponenti-
ations in GT , and n+1 pairings. Thus, the total complexity of the CV algorithm
is dominated by s(U)+ s(V )+ s(W ) exponentiations inG1, n−1 exponentiations
in G2, n exponentiations in GT , and 6m+6n−4m0+9 pairings. 4
Prover’s and verifier’s computational complexity. Since the prover and ver-
ifier in Sub-zk-SNARK in Fig. 4 remain unchanged compare with the ones in
Groth’s zk-SNARK [95], their complexity is the same as Groth’s zk-SNARK con-
struction. More accurately, the prover demands to compute h(X) (3 interpola-
tions, 1 polynomial multiplication, and 1 polynomial division; in total Θ(n logn)
non-cryptographic operations in Zp), and (n−1)+(s(A)+1)+1+(s(A)+1)+
s(A1, . . . ,Am0) ≤ n+ 3s(A) + 2 exponentiations in G1 and s(A) + 1 exponentia-
tions in G2, where s(A) is the number of large elements in A (i.e., large enough
so that exponentiating with them would be expensive). Thus, the whole com-
putational complexity of prover is Θ(n) cryptographic operations and Θ(n logn)
non-cryptographic operations. In the verifier side, one needs to check a single
pairing equation that takes m0 exponentiations in G1 and 3 pairings. The expo-
nentiations can be computed offline since they are independent of the argument pi
and only depends on the common input (A1, . . . ,Am0). Hence, the whole online
computational complexity of verifier is dominated only by 3 pairings.
Communication complexity. Similarly to Groth’s zk-SNARK [95], the argument
of Sub-zk-SNARK contains 2 elements in G1 and 1 element in G2.
4One can speed up CV by using batching technique [23]. Namely, clearly if
s
∑
i=1
ti([ai]1 [bi]2) =
[c]T for uniformly random ti, then w.h.p., [ai]1 [bi]2 = [c]T for each individual i ∈ [s]. The speed
up follows from the use of bilinear properties and from the fact that exponentiation is faster than
pairing [73, 114]. Full batched version of CV is described in the full version [8, 12]
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3.5. Subversion-Secure QA-NIZK
Motivation. Another important direction with the NIZKs is quasi-adaptive NIZKs
(QA-NIZKs) introduced by Jutla and Roy [100]. In a QA-NIZK construction, the
CRS depends on some language parameter lpar where lpar can be considered a
correctly distributed public key of some cryptosystem. The first QA-NIZK [100]
and also most of the other constructions in this line [2, 87, 100, 102, 106, 110]
are known for linear subspace languages and have only been constructed in CRS
model. The dependency between CRS and language parameter makes QA-NIZKs
very efficient and they have a lot of applications such as signatures, commitments,
PAKE schemes [2, 100, 102, 106, 110] etc. Besides, Fauzi et al. [72] coupled
QA-NIZKs and SNARKs for linear subspaces to build efficient shuffle argument
systems. Quite recently Campanelli et al. [50] used QA-NIZKs for construct-
ing a new toolbox called LegoSNARK that enables one to construct complex zk-
SNARKs, so-called commit-and-prove SNARKs (CP-SNARKs). In particular,
QA-NIZK plays an influential role as a building block in several CP-SNARKs in
Campanelli et al.’s system [50].
All the above QA-NIZK based constructions are in the CRS model where it
brings the crucial need for having a trusted party to generate the CRS. Comparing
with the subversion zk-SNARKs (in section Section 3.1), building Sub-ZK QA-
NIZKs is more complicated since the dependency between CRS and language
parameter lpar. Due to the broad applicability of QA-NIZKs in designing of
various cryptographic primitives, we investigate QA-NIZKs in subverted setup,
define corresponding security definitions, and finally explicate how one can con-
struct a subversion zero-knowledge version of the most efficient QANIZKs [106].
3.6. Previous Works
QA-NIZKs were introduced by Jutla and Roy in [100]. For linear languages L
(linear subspaces of vector spaces of bilinear groups), they have explicated that
one can build more efficient computationally-sound NIZK proofs (so-called argu-
ments) in a slightly different quasi-adaptive setting (where CRS depends of the
language parameter)5. Compared to Groth-Sahai proofs [98], QA-NIZKs in [100]
are established for linear languagesL which can be used for many cryptographic
primitives and real-world applications. In 2014, Julta and Roy in [102] gave an
enhanced version of QA-NIZK where the size of the proof was independent of
the number of equations and variables and so with a constant-size proof. In this
line of research, there has been some efforts [2, 87, 100, 102, 106, 110] for con-
structing more efficient pairing-based QA-NIZKs in CRS model. Finally, Jutla
5In the quasi-adaptive setting, a class of parameterized languages {lpar} is considered, param-
eterized by lpar, and the CRS generator is permitted to generate the CRS based on the language
parameter lpar.
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and Roy [102], and Kiltz and Wee [106] constructed the most efficient QA-NIZK
with a constant-size proof (in the most optimized case of their construction, the
proof size is only 1 group element) in the CRS model. Besides the linear lan-
guages, QA-NIZKs were constructed for some other languages like as the lan-
guage of bit-strings [87] and the ones for shuffles [88] but they are inefficient and
their CRS have quadratic-length. In addition Daza et al.’s [65] newly advanced
QA-NIZK [65] for NP-complete SSP [64] that relies on non-succinct commit-
ment. But due to the performance and the applications, the research of QA-NIZK
is mainly focused on linear subspaces.
In the line of diminishing the trust in QA-NIZKs, Charanjit et al. [101] inves-
tigated the case of a subverted language parameter lpar but honestly generated
CRS) (in an updated full version of [100] from September 2018) and explicated
how zero-knowledge and soundness can be achieved for a large family of lan-
guage subspaces in such setting. Abdolmaleki et al. [11] (the contribution of this
section) studied QA-NIZKs in a more general subverted setup where both CRS
and language parameters are subverted and built a subversion zero-knowledge ver-
sion of Kiltz-Wee’s [106] construction. Quite recently Lipmaa [115] proposed an
updatable version of our construction [11].
3.7. Problem Statement
Can one obtain Sub-ZK QA-NIZKs for linear subspaces? what is the relation be-
tween Sub-ZK QA-NIZKs in the CRS model and QA-NIZKs in the BPK model [54,
120]? Are soundness and zero-knowledge achievable when both lpar and the
CRS are subverted?
3.8. Our Solution
First, we observe that Sub-ZK in the CRS model corresponds to no-auxiliary-
string non-black-box NIZK in BPK model [54, 120]. By the impossibility result
of [22], we discern that one cannot achieve both soundness and zero-knowledge in
the case both lpar and the CRS have been subverted. Following that, we essen-
tially concentrate on the slightly more relaxed case when soundness holds if only
language parameter lpar has been subverted (Sub-PAR) and zero-knowledge
holds when both lpar and the CRS have been subverted (Sub-ZK). As the QA-
NIZKs have a more complex structure compared to SNARKs 6, one can not em-
ploy the knowledge assumptions of [9, 76] or knowledge-of-exponent assump-
tions [61] immediately translated to the case of (Kiltz-Wee) QA-NIZK. We first
define QA-NIZK in the BPK Model 7, and introduce a new algorithm PKV check-
6, For example, the most efficient known QA-NIZK for linear subspaces by Kiltz and Wee [106]
has a trapdoor matrix K but [K]1 is not explicitly supplied in the CRS
7In the BPK model, we assume that the verifier has a public key pk; the key authority Rid
performs the functionality of a bulletin board by collecting pk.
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ing whether the language parameter lpar and the public key pk (correspond to
the CRS in CRS model) are well-formed. Then we define new security definitions
QA-NIZK arguments in the BPK model: (i) persistent zero-knowledge, meaning
the zero-knowledge property when both lpar and pk have been subverted (Sub-
ZK), and (ii) Sub-PAR soundness meaning the soundness property when lpar has
been subverted. Besides, we define Sub-PAR knowledge soundness of QA-NIZK
arguments in the BPK model.
Finally, to deliver a concrete Sub-ZK QA-NIZK, we implement the above
security definitions together with the new algorithm PKV for the most-efficient
known QA-NIZK by Kiltz and Wee [106] for linear subspaces. A full description
of our construction is given in the paper [11], which is joint work with Lipmaa,
Siim and Zajac.
3.8.1. Subversion ZK in the CRS Model and ZK in the BPK Model
A zero-knowledge argument in the BPK model can be perceived as either designated-
verifier (the proof convinces only the designated verifier) when the public key pk
is generated by the verifier or transferable (the verifier can transfer the argument
to other verifiers and convince them of its legality) when pk is generated by a third
party. We note that by viewing pk as the CRS, the latter case is equivalent to the
CRS model and so the BPK model is significantly weaker than the CRS model.
Intuitively we first observe that no-auxiliary-string non-black-box zero knowl-
edge [85] in the BPK model [54, 120] is equivalent to Sub-ZK in the CRS model,
as defined in [9, 22, 76]. Such an important connection (between Sub-ZK and
no-auxiliary-string non-black-box zero knowledge) was not contemplated in the
prior work on the Sub-ZK area and might be useful in interpreting the future
Sub-ZK systems. Due to such connection, we use the notation Sub-ZK to denote
no-auxiliary-string non-black-box zero knowledge in the BPK model.
Additionally due to the impossibility results [85] of having three rounds auxiliary-
string zero-knowledge (and so auxiliary-string non-black-box NIZK) in the plain
model, in lemma 1 of [11] we conclude that one only can construct no-auxiliary-
string non-black-box NIZK for languages outside of BPP. Thus in the rest of
this section by QA-NIZK in BPK model we mean that it is no-auxiliary-string8
non-black-box NIZK but to ease of readability we drop it.
3.8.2. Defining QA-NIZK in the BPK Model
A QA-NIZK argument is an important tool for proving membership in a language
defined by a relationRρ = {(x,w)}, with the language parameter lpar := ρ from
a distribution Dp. As we argued before, the primary security definitions of QA-
8Auxiliary-string non-black-box ZK [85] means that definitions hold even if any aux ∈
{0,1}poly(λ ) is given as an additional input to A .
49
NIZK [100] were defined in the CRS model9. In this part, we strengthen the
primary definitions by assuming that both language parameter ρ and public key
pk can be subverted. We then lift the definitions to the weaker BPK model. Mo-
tivated by the Sub-zk-SNARKs definitions of our work [9] (see Section 3.1), we
first define the new algorithm PKV that checks if ρ and pk in BPK model are
well-formed. Additionally, we define the new algorithm PARV which is the ρ-
verification algorithm. Then by employing a PKV algorithm, we lift the primary
QA-NIZKs definition to the BPK model. Following [22], we assume that the sys-
tem parameters (i.e, the description of the bilinear group) p is deterministically
generated from λ and so p is not permitted to be subverted.
For a set of witness-relations Rp = {Rρ}ρ∈Supp(Dp )10, we say a tuple of PPT
algorithms Π = (Pgen,KK,PARV,PKV,P,V,Sim) is a Sub-ZK QA-NIZK argu-
ment system in the BPK model if the following Items i, ii, iv and v hold. In
addition, Π is a Sub-ZK QA-NIZK argument of knowledge, if Item iii holds.
Let Pgen be the parameter generation algorithm, KK is the public key pk gen-
eration algorithm, PARV is the ρ-verification algorithm, PKV is the public key
verification algorithm, P is the prover, V is the verifier, and Sim is the simulator.
(i) Perfect Completeness: for any λ , p ∈ im(Pgen(1λ )),
Pr
ρ←$Dp;(pk,sk)← KK(ρ);(x,w)←A (pk);pi ← P(ρ,pk,x,w) : PARV(ρ) = 1 ∧ PKV(ρ,pk) = 1∧
((x,w) 6∈Rρ ∨ V(ρ,pk,x,pi) = 1)
= 1 .
(ii) Computational Quasi-Adaptive Sub-PAR Soundness: for any PPT A
and p ∈ im(Pgen(1λ )),
Pr
[
ρ ←A (p);(pk,sk)← KK(ρ);(x,pi)←A (pk) :
PARV(ρ) = 1 ∧ V(ρ,pk,x,pi) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w :Rρ(x,w) = 1))
]
≈λ 0 .
(iii) Computational Quasi-Adaptive Sub-PAR Knowledge-Soundness: for ev-
ery PPT adversary adversary A , there exist a PPT extractor ExtA , s.t. for
all p ∈ im(Pgen(1λ )),
Pr
r←$ RNDλ (A );ρ ←A (p;r);(pk,sk)← KK(ρ);(x,pi)←A (pk;r);w← ExtA (p,pk;r) : PARV(ρ) = 1∧
V(ρ,pk,x,pi) = 1 ∧Rρ(x,w) = 0
≈λ 0 .
A knowledge-sound argument system is called an argument of knowledge.
9Later Jutla and Roy modified the definitions by assuming the case that the language parameter
ρ is maliciously chosen in the full version of their paper [101]
10Recall that a distributionDp onLρ is witness-sampleable [100] if there exists a PPT algorithm
D ′p that samples (ρ,tdρ ) ∈Rp such that ρ is distributed according to Dp.
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(iv) Statistical Zero Knowledge: for any p ∈ im(Pgen(1λ )) and computation-
ally unbounded adversary A , |εzk0 − εzk1 | ≈λ 0, where εzkb :=
Pr
[
ρ ←Dp;(pk,sk)← KK(ρ) :A Ob(·,·)(ρ,pk) = 1
]
.
The oracle O0(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ , and otherwise it re-
turns P(ρ,pk,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ ,
and otherwise it returns Sim(ρ,pk,sk,x).
(v) Statistical Persistent Zero Knowledge: for any PPT subverter Z, there ex-
ists a PPT extractor ExtZ, s.t. for any p∈ im(Pgen(1λ )) and computationally
unbounded adversary A , |εzk0 − εzk1 | ≈λ 0, where
εzkb := Pr
[
r←$ RNDλ (Z);(ρ,pk,aux)← Z(p;r);sk← ExtZ(p;r) :
PARV(ρ) = 1 ∧ PKV(ρ,pk) = 1 ∧ A Ob(·,·)(ρ,pk,aux) = 1
]
.
The oracle O0(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ , and otherwise it re-
turns P(ρ,pk,x,w). Similarly, O1(x,w) returns ⊥ (reject) if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ ,
and otherwise it returns Sim(ρ,pk,sk,x).
We emphasize thatΠ is statistically Sub-ZK if both statistically zero-knowledge
(with trusted ρ and pk generators) and statistically persistent zero-knowledge
(with possibly subverted ρ and pk) hold. Importantly, the reason why we need
both properties to hold is the following: let Z be a subverter that creates both the
language parameter ρ and the public key pk. For persistent zero-knowledge we
assume an efficient extractor ExtZ, such that given Z’s random coins r as an input,
it returns the secret key sk corresponding to pk (since there is no auxiliary input, ρ
and pk have to be generated by Z with the random coins r). However, since we al-
low both lpar and pk be chosen by Z, it is possible that Z sets sk= tdlpar. There-
fore, in this case, persistent zero-knowledge holds but standard zero-knowledge
does not hold (see the corresponding example in section 4 of [11]).
3.8.3. Constructing QA-NIZK in the BPK Model
We commence with the most efficient QA-NIZK construction Π′as of Kiltz-Wee
QA-NIZK [106] and build a Sub-ZK version of Π′as which serves the aforemen-
tioned security definitions in the BPK model. In particular, we implement the
PKV algorithm for Kiltz-Wee QA-NIZK Π′as such that one (prover) can check if
the public key in BPK (or CRS of its version in the CRS model) and the language
parameter ρ are well-formed. In addition, to satisfy zero-knowledge property, we
define two different (tautological) knowledge assumptions, KWKE (Kiltz-Wee
Knowledge of Exponent assumption) and SKWKE (Strong Kiltz-Wee Knowledge
of Exponent assumption) enabling the simulator Sim to obtain the correct secret
key sk = K of Π′as (for computing the simulated proof).
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check [a11]2 6= [0]2 ∧ . . . ∧ [akk]2 6= [0]2;
if Dk =Lk then check i 6= j⇒ [ai, j]2 = [0]2;
elseifDk =IL k then check i 6= j⇒ [ai j]2 = [0]2;∀i, [ai,i]2 = [a1,1]2+[i−1]2;
elseif Dk = Ck then check i 6∈ { j, j+1}⇒ [ai j]2 = [0]2;∀i, [ai+1,i]2 = [1]2;
elseif Dk =SC k then check i 6∈ { j, j+1}⇒ [ai j]2 = [0]2;
∀i([ai+1,i]2 = [1]2 ∧ [aii]2 = [a11]2) ;fi
return 1 if all checks pass and 0 otherwise.
Figure 6. Auxiliary procedure MATV([A¯]2) for Dk ∈ {Lk,IL k,Ck,SC k}.
New algorithm PKV. We recall the CRS of Kiltz-Wee QA-NIZK [106] Π′as
includes crs = ([A¯,C]2, [P]1) where A¯ ∈ Zk×kp denotes the upper square matrix of
A ∈ Z(k+1)×kp (see Section 2.12). Then by lifting Π′as into the BPK model, we
define the public key pk = (pksnd,pkzk) where pksnd = [A¯,C]2 and pkzk = [P]1.
Inspired from CV algorithm of our work [9] (see Section 3.1), we propose
the new algorithm PKV with the following steps: (i) add some new elements to
the public key pk (where we denote these elements by pkpkv), and (ii) efficiently
verify the the membership of A¯ inDk. For the latter case, additionally, we propose
another algorithm MATV(.) checking invertibility of the matrix A¯ (see Fig. 6).
We say that the distribution Dk is efficiently verifiable if there is an algorithm
MATV([A¯]2) that outputs 1 if A¯ is invertible and well-formed with regard to Dk
and otherwise outputs 0. Finally we construct the PKV algorithm that is depicted
in Fig. 7.
KK(ρ := [M]1 ∈Gn×m1 ): A←$Dk; K←$Zn×kp ; [C]2 ← [KA¯]2 ∈ Gn×k2 ; [P]1 ←
[M]>1 K ∈Gm×k1 ;
if Dk is efficiently verifiable then pkpkv ← ε; elseif Dk = U2 then
pkpkv← [a11,a12]1; fi ; pksnd← [A¯,C]2; pkzk← [P]1;
pk← (pksnd,pkzk,pkpkv); sk← K; return (pk,sk);
PKV([M]1,pk): Return 1 only if the following checks all succeed:
pk = (pksnd,pkzk,pkpkv)∧pksnd = [A¯,C]2∧pkzk = [P]1;
[P]1 ∈Gm×k1 ∧ [A¯]2 ∈Gk×k2 ∧ [C]2 ∈Gn×k2 ;
(∗) [M]>1 [C]2 = [P]1[A¯]2;
if Dk is efficiently verifiable then MATV([A¯]2);
else check pkpkv = [a11,a12]1 ∈G1×21 ∧ [a11]1[1]2 = [1]1[a11]2∧
[a12]1[1]2 = [1]1[a12]2 ∧ [a11]1[a22]2− [a12]1[a21]2 6= [0]T ;fi
Figure 7. Algorithm PKV for [y]1 = [M]1w in the BPK model, where either Dk is effi-
ciently verifiable or Dk =U2.
New knowledge assumptions. For providing Sub-ZK property in the BPK model
(or in subverted setting) we define the two new knowledge assumptions, KWKE
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and SKWKE. Roughly speaking the KWKE assumption guarantees that one can
extract a secret key sk = K from which one can generate pkzk = [P]1 but not
necessarily pksnd. On the other hand, by the knowledge assumption SKWKE, one
can extract the unique secret key K that was used to generate the whole public key
pk=(pksnd,pkzk). Notice that to deliver Sub-ZK, one only needs to guarantee that
pkzk can be calculated form sk and so KWKE knowledge assumption is sufficient.
More formally, in KWKE assumption, we assume that if A outputs a ρ ∈Dp
and a pk accepted by PKV, then there exists an extractor ExtA who, knowing the
secret coins of A , returns a secret key K that could have been used to compute
pkzk. SKWKE additionally assures that the same K has been used to compute
pksnd.
Definition 18. Fix k ≥ 1, n > m ≥ 1, and a distribution Dk. Let PKV be as in
Fig. 7. Then (Dp,k,Dk)-KWKEG1 (resp., (Dp,k,Dk)-SKWKEG1 ) holds relative
to Pgen if for any p ∈ im(Pgen(1λ )) and PPT adversary A , there exists a PPT
extractor ExtA , s.t. Adv
s kwke
Dp,k,Dk,G1,Pgen,A ,ExtA (λ ) :=
Pr
r←$ RNDλ (A );(ρ := [M]1,pk)←A (p;r);K← ExtA (p;r) :pk = ([A¯,C]2, [P]1,pkpkv)∧ [M]1 ∈Dp∧
PKV([M]1,pk) = 1 ∧ (P 6= M>K ∨C 6= KA¯ )
≈λ 0 .
Here, the boxed part is only present in the definition of SKWKE.
Definition 19. D`k-WKerMDHG1 holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr[p← Pgen(1λ );A←$D`k;c←A (p, [A]1) : A>c = 0k∧ c 6= 0`]≈λ 0.
Admittedly, WKerMDH is a weaker variant of the KerMDH distribution. No-
tice that the assumption of WKerMDH-hardness often holds in practice, for exam-
ple when ρ is a randomly chosen public key of a commitment scheme or a cryp-
tosystem. We proved the security of KWKE and SKWKE under hash-algebraic
knowledge (HAK) [116]11 and refer [11] for details of the proofs.
New interactive assumptions KerMDHdl and SKerMDHdl. As we stated in
Section 3.8.2, in Sub-PAR soundness, the language parameter ρ = [M]1 is ma-
liciously chosen. Thus in Sub-PAR soundness proof, we require that the trapdoor
of ρ is extractable. To deal with this matter we define a new interactive non-
falsifiable KerMDHdl (also SKerMDHdl) assumption that ables one to extract the
trapdoor of M from [M]1. More precisely, in the soundness proof of Kiltz-Wee
QA-NIZK [106], the KerMDH adversary B obtains ([M]1,M) sampled from D ′p
(this relies on the witness-sampleability). But in our Sub-PAR soundness proof
(we will see later in Theorem 4), B receives [M]1 ← A (p) and then employs a
11Lipmaa [116] recently established the framework of HAK assumptions to make the algebraic
group model (AGM) of Fuchsbauer et al. [79] more concrete and applicable. While in the AGM,
it is assumed that every adversary is algebraic, a HAK assumption is defined concerning a concrete
input distribution of the adversary.
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non-adaptive DL oracle to extract M and so importantly, our proof does not need
witness-sampleability. The SDLdl, KerMDHdl and SKerMDHdl assumptions are
XY -type interactive assumptions as applied in [84, 112], where we contemplated
that the assumption X holds if even the adversary can non-adaptively (i.e., before
the X is picked) query an oracle that can solve the assumption Y .
The SDLdl assumption holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );st←A dl(·)(p);x←$Zp :A (p,st, [x]1, [x]2) = x
]
≈λ 0 .
Here, the oracle dl([y]1) returns the discrete logarithm y of [y]1.
The D`k-KerMDHdlG1 assumption holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );st←A dl(·)(p);A←$D`k; [c]2←A (p,st, [A]1) :
A>c = 0k ∧ c 6= 0`
]
≈λ 0 .
The D`k-SKerMDHdl assumption holds relative to Pgen, if for any PPT A ,
Pr
[
p← Pgen(1λ );st←A dl(·)(p);A←$D`k;
([c1]1, [c2]2)←A (p,st, [A]1, [A]2) : A>(c1− c2) = 0k ∧ c1− c2 6= 0`
]
≈λ 0 .
Now by putting all the aforementioned algorithms and techniques together, we
build a QA-NIZK in the BPK model.
QA-NIZK Construction in the BPK Model. Finally to build QA-NIZK Πbpk
in the BPK Model (or subversion ZK QA-NIZK in CRS model), one can take
Kiltz-Wee QA-NIZK Π′as for linear subspaces [106] and attach the new algorithm
PKV to their construction. In Theorem 4 we prove the security of the construed
QA-NIZK Πbpk in the BPK model.
Theorem 4. Assume that Dp is such that PARV is efficient.
(i) Πbpk is perfectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge.
(ii) If (Dp,k,Dk)-KWKEG1 holds relative to Pgen then Πbpk is statistically per-
sistent zero-knowledge.
(iii) AssumeDk is efficiently verifiable (resp.,Dk =U2). IfDk-KerMDHdl (resp.,
Dk-SKerMDHdl) holds relative to Pgen then Πbpk is computationally quasi-
adaptively Sub-PAR sound.
(iv) Assume M has rank n (y=Mw always has a solution), and thatDk is robust.
If SDLdl and KGen([M]1)-HAK, for arbitrary efficiently computable [M]1,
hold relative to Pgen then Πbpk is computationally quasi-adaptively Sub-
PAR knowledge-sound.
See the proof of Theorem 4 in [11].
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4. UC-SECURE COMMITMENT CONSTRUCTIONS
General Motivation for UC-Secure commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme
allows a committer C to transmit an analogue of a sealed envelope of her message
m to a receiver R. Later the committer C can open her committed message m
and together with some additional information. The receiver R verifies whether
m is correctly enveloped. Such systems should assure that C cannot later change
the enveloped message m to some m′ 6= m (binding property); while the receiver
R must not learn any information of the enveloped message m (hiding property).
One of the momentous aspects for practical applications of cryptographic pro-
tocols particularly in NIZKs or SNARKs (i.e, for implementing their CRS) is
achieving Universal Composability (UC). This is a strong property was that intro-
duced by in [52]. Informally, UC-secure protocols guarantee the security even if
executed with other instances of the same protocol, or when composed with other
protocols. To make commitment schemes UC-secure, one needs to provide the
additional properties: (i) extractability, states that given a trapdoor, one (i.e, the
simulator Sim in UC proof) can recover the committed value m, and (ii) equivo-
cability means that given a trapdoor, one (i.e, the simulator Sim in UC proof) can
open a commitment to any message m′ 6= m.
In this chapter we investigate building efficient UC-secure commitments; one
with utilizing a new primitive called publicly computable SPHF (PC-SPHF) which
is currently the most efficient non-interactive UC-secure commitment [10]; and
another one [6], which is an special UC-secure commitment called DL-extractable
commitment that is compatible with MPC approach (aiming to generate the CRS
of NIZKs in a UC secure manner)1.
1Later Abdolmaleki et al. [7] used the UC-secure DL-extractable commitment to generate the
CRS of SNARK [94] with MPC in a UC-secure manner.
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4.1. UC-Secure Commitment from PC-SPHF
Motivation. In general UC-secure commitment scheme plays an influential role
in many cryptographic protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs and multi-party
computation. Therefore constructing an efficient UC-secure commitment scheme
is an active area and so far there has been many efforts [4–6, 27, 74, 100] to
achieve an efficient UC-secure commitment scheme. Constructing efficient UC-
secure commitments falls into the following two categories: (i) the line following
the ideas of Canetti-Fischlin [52] including [4–6,27], and (ii) the lines employing
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the opening phase of the commitment
as Fischlin et al.’s schemes [74] and improvements thereof [100]. In this part, we
continue into the latter direction, and instead of non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs, we explicate how one can utilize the new primitive PC-SPHF and construct
a framework for non-interactive UC-secure commitment scheme.
4.2. Problem Statement
Can we construct a compact framework for the UC-Secure commitment scheme?
What tools could lead us to design efficient UC-Secure commitment respecting
communication complexity and the number of rounds of the protocol? What are
the best choices of cryptographic tools to instantiate such UC-secure commit-
ments?
4.3. Our Solution
We start through the notion of SPHF in the bilinear group and extend it to build
a new primitive called publicly computable SPHF (PC-SPHF). In particular, we
append a new algorithm (the third mode of hashing) to SPHF systems. The new
algorithm enables one to compute the hash value without knowing neither the
witness of the language nor the hashing key, but some additional auxiliary in-
formation. We mainly define PC-SPHFs for languages of ciphertexts and show
it can cover lots of important schemes such as ElGamal [70] and Cramer-Shoup
(CS) [60] cryptosystems. We then employ PC-SPHFs primitive built from any
proper SPHF for a (labeled) IND-CCA encryption scheme and construct a generic
UC-secure commitment scheme. Finally, we instantiate this framework with CS
encryption [60] and construct the currently most efficient non-interactive UC-
secure commitment. We compare the performance of our UC-secure commitment
with existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments in Table 4.3.4. A full de-
scription of our construction is given in the paper [10], that is joint work with
Khoshakhlagh and Slamanig.
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4.3.1. New Primitive: PC-SPHF
We recall that SPHFs [60] for a language Llpar, parameterized by a language
parameter lpar, are cryptographic primitives with the following properties. Given
a word x, one can compute a hash of it in two different ways: (i) either utilizing
a projection key hp (an analogue of a public key), a word x, and a witness w,
as pH← projhash(lpar;hp,x,w), or (ii) using a hashing key hk (an analogue
of a secret key) and a word x, as H← hash(lpar;hk,x). where the algorithms
projhash and hash are respectively the projection hash and the hash generators. If
x∈Llpar and w is a valid witness of this fact, then the correctness (also known as
projectivity) property guarantees that the two ways of computing the hash result
in the same value, pH = H. If x 6∈L , then the smoothness property guarantees
that, knowing hp but not hk, one cannot distinguish H from random.
We introduce a new feature (a third mode of hashing pcH) for SPHFs and de-
fine a new primitive called PC-SPHFs. More accurately, pcH algorithm computes
the hash value in target group GT without taking neither the witness w nor the
hashing key hk as input, but some additional auxiliary information aux. Our PC-
SPHF is similar to the trapdoor SPHFs in [27, 28] with some modifications, but
has completely different motivations, and algorithms.
In particular, a PC-SPHF can be built upon an SPHF and then instantiated
in the bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ). In contrast with SPHFs system, in PC-
SPHFs, the projkg algorithm takes a hashing key hk, a word x and languageLaux,
and returns a projection key hp that contains two parts hp = (hp1,hp2) ∈ Gkι ×
Gn3−ι . The projection key hp1 is the one underlying SPHF and the projection key
hp2 is intuitively some representation of the hashing key hk.
Definition 20. A PC-SPHF for language Laux based upon SPHF is defined by
the following algorithms:
Pgen(1λ ,Laux): Takes a security parameter λ and languageLaux and generates
the global parameters p, and the crsLaux . It outputs (p,aux,crsLaux).
hashkg(Laux): Takes a languageLaux and outputs a hashing key hk = α←$Znp
for the languageLaux of the underlying SPHF.
projkg(hk,crsLaux ,x): Takes a hashing key hk, a CRS crs, and possibly a word
x and outputs a projection key hp = (hp1,hp2) ∈ Gkι ×Gn3−ι , possibly de-
pending on x, where hp1 is the projection key of the underlying SPHF and
hp2 is some representation of hk.
hash(hk,crsLaux ,aux,x): Takes a hashing key hk, a CRS crs, aux, and a word x
and outputs a hash H ∈Gι , being the hash of the underlying SPHF.
projhash(hp,crsLaux ,aux,x,w): Takes a projection key hp, a CRS crsLaux , aux, a
word x, and a witness w for x ∈Laux and outputs a hash pH ∈ Gι , being
the projective hash of the underlying SPHF.
pchash(hp,crsLaux ,aux,x): Takes a projection key hp, a CRS crsLaux , aux, and a
word x, and outputs a hash pcH ∈GT .
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(p,aux,crsLaux)← Pgen(1λ ,Laux), x←$Xaux \Laux, hk← hashkg(Laux),
hp← projkg(hk,crsLaux ,x);
If b = 0, then H← hash(hk,crsLaux ,aux,x), else H←$Ω;
return A (crsLaux ,x,hp,H)
Figure 8. Experiments Expcsmooth-b(A ,λ ) for computational smoothness.
A PC-SPHF should satisfy the following properties:
Perfect correctness. For any (p,aux,crsLaux)← Pgen(1λ ,Laux), any word x ∈
Laux with witness w, any hk← hashkg(Laux), and hp← projkg(hk,crsLaux ,x):
pH · [1]3−ι = pcH.
The (t,ε)-soundness property. For any (p,aux,crsLaux)←Pgen(1λ ,Laux), given
crsLaux and the projection key hp, no adversary running in time at most t
can produce a value aux, a word x and valid witness w such that the follow-
ing holds, projhash(hp,crsLaux ,aux,x,w) 6= hash(hk,crsLaux ,aux,x), with
probability at least ε . Perfect soundness requires that this holds for any t
and any ε > 0.
Computational Smoothness. The computational smoothness experiment is pro-
vided in Fig. 8. For a language Laux and adversary A , the advantage is
defined as follows:
AdvcsmoothLaux,A (λ )= |Pr[Expcsmooth−0(A ,λ )= 1]−Pr[Expcsmooth−1(A ,λ )= 1]|.
and we require that AdvcsmoothLaux,A (λ )≤ negl (λ ).
See the security analyzes of PC-SPHF in [10].
4.3.2. A Framework for UC-Secure Commitment Scheme
Now we present a generic UC-secure commitment scheme from any IND-CCA
secure labeled public-key encryption scheme with an associated PC-SPHF. Intu-
itively, in our framework a committer C commits the message with an IND-CCA
secure labeled ciphertext. Then by knowing the witness w (i.e., the randomness
used in the encryption), C computes the projective hash pH and reveals it in the
opening phase of the protocol. In the verification phase, the receiver R first com-
putes the hash value pcH and verifies the commitment. Additionally in the the UC
security proof, given the hashing key hk a simulator Sim computes the hash value
H as the simulated proof of pH.
We utilize Canetti-Fischlin’s ideal functionality of a commitment scheme [53]
in the security proof of our generic UC-secure commitment. Let sid be a standard
commitment identifier 2. Following the functionality of [53] we define sid to be
2The standard commitment identifier sid shows the case when a committer C commits to a re-
ceiver R within a session.
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Kcrs(1λ ): generate a secret and public key (sk,pk) for a labeled IND-CCA en-
cryption scheme, set crsLaux = pk. Compute hk← hashkg(Laux) and
hp← projkg(hk,crsLaux , ·) and set crs := (crsLaux ,hp).
/ Commit phase:
Commit(crs,M,sid,cid,Pi,Pj): commit to message M ∈G1 for party Pj, upon
receiving a command (commit,sid,cid,Pi,Pj,M), party Pi chooses ran-
domness r and computes c = Encτpk(M;r) with τ = (sid,cid,Pi) and
pH← projhash(hp,crsLaux ,Mc,r). Pi erases r and sends c to Pj and stores
pH. Upon receiving (commit,sid,cid,Pi,Pj,c) from Pi, party Pj verifies
c is well-formed. If yes, Pj outputs (receipt,sid,cid,Pi,Pj). Otherwise,
Pj ignores the message.
/ Opening phase:
Open(M,pH,sid,cid,Pi,Pj): when receiving a command (open,sid,cid,
Pi,Pj,M), party Pi reveals M and his state information pH.
/ Verification phase:
Ver(crs,(commit,sid,cid,c),M,pH,sid,cid,Pi,Pj) : Pj computes pcH ←
pchash(hp,crsLaux ,M,c) and verifies pH, i.e., whether pH · [1]2 = pcH,
and ignores the opening if verification fails. If verification succeeds,
Pj outputs (open,sid,cid,Pi,Pj,M) iff cid has not been used with this
committer previously. Otherwise, Pj also ignores the message.
Figure 9. Generic UC-Secure Commitment from PC-SPHFs.
a standard commitment identifier 3. We use another unique commitment identifier
cid, for the case when a committer C commits to the same receiver R multiple
times within a session. Besides, we assume that the combination of sid and cid
is globally unique. Our framework for UC-secure commitment is secure against
adaptive corruptions (assuming reliable erasure) and it is shown in Fig. 9. See the
security proof of the Generic UC-Secure Commitment scheme of Fig. 9 in [10]
(see Section 5.2).
4.3.3. Efficient UC-Secure Commitment Scheme
Finally in this section we build an efficient UC-secure commitment by instanti-
ating the framework in Fig. 9 with labeled CS encryption scheme and PC-SPHF
on labeled CS ciphertexts. The resulting scheme carries 4 elements in G1 in the
commit phase and one element in G1 in the opening phase. To the best of our
knowledge, this is currently the most efficient non-interactive UC-secure commit-
ment scheme.
In the following we give a brief explanation of the PC-SPHF construction for
labeled CS ciphertexts that is the core of building the efficient UC secure commit-
3The standard commitment identifier sid shows the case when a committer C commits to a re-
ceiver R within a session.
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Scheme |Commitment| |Opening| Assumption
[53] 9×G 2×Zp Plain DDH
[74],1 5×G1 16×G1 DLIN
[74],2 37×G1 3×G1 DLIN
[100] 4×G1 3×G1+2×G2 SXDH
[100] 4×G1 4×G1 DLIN
[1] 8×G1+G2 Zp SXDH
[4] 7×G 2×Zp Plain DDH
PC-SPHFCS 4×G1 G1 XDH
Table 2. Comparison with some existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments with a
single global CRS when committing to a single message.
ment.
PC-SPHF on (Labeled) Cramer-Shoup Ciphertexts We explicate how to ex-
tend the SPHF on (labeled) CS ciphertexts into a PC-SPHF. The CRS crsLaux con-
tains the encryption public key pk. With the hashing key hk=(η1,η2,θ ,µ, ι)←$Z5p
and the projection key hp = ([hp1]1, [hp2]2), where [hp11]1 = η1[g1]1 + θ [g2]1 +
µ[h]1 + ι [c]1, and [hp12]1 = η2[g1]1 + ι [d]1, and [hp2]2 = [η1,η2,θ ,µ, ι ]2 ∈ G52,
and aux = [m]1, the hash values of the PC-SPHF are defined as follows:
H =hash(hk,crsLaux , [m]1, [c]1)
=(η1+ξη2)[u1]1+θ [u2]1+µ([e]1− [m]1)+ ι [v]1 ∈G1
pH =projhash(hp,crsLaux , [m]1, [c]1,r) = r[hp11]1+ rξ [hp12]1 ∈G1
pcH =pchash(hp,crsLaux , [m]1, [c]1)
=[u1]1[hp21]2+[u1]1 ·ξ [hp22]2+[u2]1[hp23]2+([e]1− [m]1)[hp24]2
+[v]1[hp25]2 = [u1]1[η1]2+[u1]1 ·ξ [η2]2+[u2]1[θ ]2
+([e]1− [m]1)[µ]2+[v]1[ι ]2 ∈GT ·
4.3.4. Comparisons
We compare the performance of our UC-secure commitment PC-SPHFCS with
existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments in Table 4.3.4 4
For the comparison, we consider a type 3 bilinear group with the desired secu-
rity level of 128 bit. Common preferences are Baretto-Naehrig (BN) or Barreto-
Lynn-Scott (BLS) curves. A conservative estimate for this security level results
elements in G1, G2 and GT of size 2 · 384, 4 · 384 and 12 · 384 bits for BN and
BLS12 and 2 · 320, 4 · 320 and 24 · 320 for BLS24 (without point compression)
4Notice that following existing literature we concentrate on the size of commitments and open-
ings and exclude the message(s) in the opening information.
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respectively [119]. Besides, we assume elliptic curves over prime fields to instan-
tiate the plain DDH setting, elements of G will have at least 2 · 256 bits (with-
out point compression) when targeting 128-bit security. Consequently, assuming
point compression is utilized in both schemes, the commitment and opening size
of the UC-commitment in [4] is 1799 and 512 bits respectively. Our UC-secure
commitment has a commitment and opening size of 1284 and 321 bit respectively,
improving [4] by about 30%. Moreover, compared to the most efficient construc-
tion in bilinear groups (i.e., [1]), we gain the opening size with a factor of 4.
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4.4. UC-Secure Commitment with Integer Extraction
Motivation. As we noted before, an important goal, especially for practitioners is
implementing the CRS mode. More precisely, the main challenge is diminishing
trust in the CRS generation phase. In other words, how one can guarantee the
CRS generated by a single partyR is chosen from the correct distribution without
any leakage of its trapdoors. A weaker setup model called registered public key
(RPK) was introduced by Barak et al. [19]. In fact, in the RPK setting instead of
having only one trusted party (in the CRS model), each party Gi should trust some
key registration authority Ri who registers her key. In particular, the CRS model
is a strong variant of the RPK model where the authority Ri of each party is the
same and all parties must trust only one authorityR.
Kosba et al. [109] proposes a framework that transfers any zk-SNARK into a
UC-secure SNARK with the cost of adding a trusted setup, run by a single party
which is not UC secure. To have a fully UC-secure zk-SNARK with distributed
trust in the setup phase, one needs to construct a UC-secure CRS-generation pro-
tocol by MPC. Due to the particular structure of pairing-based zk-SNARKs, in or-
der to achieve that, one would require a particular UC-secure commitment scheme
along with its corresponding UC-functionality. More precisely, consider the set-
ting that the secrecy of a committed value x is important, namely revealing x
enables to break of the privacy of the scheme, but to generate the CRS elements,
the parties need to reveal gx. On the other hand, in the UC setting the universal
simulator needs to know x to simulate the corrupted committer C. This brought
us to the point that we need a UC functionality that would allow the committer
C to commit to x while later open to a group element gx, and also allow the UC
simulator to extract the integer x. In this chapter, we deal with the above research
question and propose the mentioned ideal functionality along with a commitment
(called DL-extractable commitment) that UC-securely realizes the proposed func-
tionality. Also we note that Abdolmaleki et al. [7] uses our UC-secure commit-
ment (see Section 4.8.2) to construct the CRS of Groth’s SNARK [94]. In order
to keep the consistency of the result in the paper [6] and this section, we use the
standard notation gx instead of the bracket notation [x]ι .
4.5. Problem Statement
Can we construct a UC-secure commitment that is compatible with MPC approach
(i.e., for generating the CRS of UC-secure SNARKs [109] to have a fully UC-
secure SNARK of [109])? More precisely, can we construct a UC-secure com-
mitment that enables the committer to open a commitment to a group element (i.e,
the group element gx); however, the simulator could extract its discrete logarithm
of the group element (i.e, the integer x)?
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4.6. Our Solution
We start by defining a new ideal UC functionality Fmcomdl that will be used for
our final goal, constructing a UC-secure commitment scheme called DL-extractable
commitment. Intuitively, in contrast with the standard functionality of UC-secure
commitment schemes [53], the functionality Fmcomdl, in the committing phase,
enables a committer C to send a message m to the functionality. While in the
opening phase,Fmcomdl passes gm ∈G to a receiver R (but the standard function-
ality of [53] passes the message m). As the functionality Fmcomdl stores m, the
UC simulator gets to know m and can simulate the corrupted committer.
Then, we construct a UC-secure commitment Γdl that realizes the functionality
Fmcomdl in the RPK model. Essentially, our UC-secure commitment Γdl is built
on CRS-model based Fujisaki’s UC-commitment scheme Fuj [80] with some ma-
jor modifications (see Section 4.6.2). Briefly, we first split the CRS of the Fuj
construction into two independent parts, one guarantees the binding property and
another part is guaranteeing the hiding property. Then we represent it in the RPK
model. 5
After that, in the commit phase, we equip Fuj construction with the efficient
IND-CPA secure Short Cramer-Shoup (SCS, [3]) public-key cryptosystem. We
add a Σ-protocol Σeq (see Section 4.6.2) to prove the knowledge of the discrete
logarithm m of the SCS-encrypted message. Additionally, in order to satisfy the
extractability of m, we equip it with an integer commitment [62] and an additively
homomorphic Paillier encryption [125] of m. More precisely we use the Pail-
lier encryption for the extraction phase and use the integer commitment to prove
that the SCS encryption and Paillier encryption of m are mutually consistent. Fi-
nally, by the combination of the above tools, we construct the DL-extractable
UC-commitment scheme Γdl where committer can open a commitment to a group
element gm; while given the secret key of the Paillier encryption, the UC simulator
can extract m from a corrupted committer, thanks to the Paillier encryption. A full
description of our construction is given in the paper [6], which is joint work with
Baghery, Lipmaa, Siim, and Zajac.
4.6.1. New Ideal functionality Fmcomdl
We define the new ideal functionalityFmcomdl, in a way that it lets parties commit
to an integer m but open the commitment to gm. Importantly the functionality
Fmcomdl stores the integer m which later enables the UC simulator Sim to extract
m. Therefore, any commitment scheme should necessarily be DL-extractable if
it realizes the Fmcomdl functionality. See Fig. 10 for the details of the Fmcomdl
5Note that the RPK model is relatively unknown in the community, so reintroducing it and
constructing an efficient commitment scheme in this model can be seen as another contribution of
this work.
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Fmcomdl is parameterized by M = Zp and G, interacts with the party Gi ∈
{C,R} for i ∈ [ν ] (where ν is the number of the parties) as follows.
Upon receiving (commit,sid,cid,Gi,G j,m) from Gi, where m ∈ Zp: if a tuple
(sid,cid, · · ·) with the same (sid,cid) was previously recorded, do noth-
ing. Otherwise, record (sid,cid,Gi,G j,m) and send (rcpt,sid,cid,Gi,G j)
to G j and Sim.
Upon receiving (open,sid,cid) from Gi, proceed as follows: if
a tuple (sid,cid,Gi,G j,m) was previously recorded then send
(open,sid,cid,Gi,G j,y ← gm) to G j and Sim. Otherwise do noth-
ing.
Figure 10. DL-extractable functionalityFmcomdl for committing multiple messages
functionality 6. Following the functionality of [53] we define sid to be a standard
commitment identifier 7. We use another unique commitment identifier cid, for the
case when a committer C commits to the same receiver R multiple times within
a session. Besides, we assume that the combination of sid and cid is globally
unique.
4.6.2. DL-Extractable UC-Commitment Scheme
We construct the DL-extractable UC-commitment scheme by implementing the
functionalityFmcomdl as follows: (i) for m∈Zp, by using the SCS [3], we encrypt
the group element gm, (ii) by using the additively homomorphic Paillier public-
key cryptosystem [125], encrypt the integer m, and (iii) finally use Damgård-
Fujisaki [62]’s commitment and commit to the integer m.
After that for proving the knowledge of integer m that was used in the afore-
mentioned schemes, we equip the scheme with a Σ-protocol Σeq. Importantly,
from Σeq one can only extract gm and so m itself remains secret. As it is known
that the UC-security property does not permit us to perform rewinding to retrieve
m, we use straight-line extraction techniques from [80].
During the commit phase, we use the Σ-protocol, and after that, the used ran-
dom coins will be erased (by the committer C). Then C opens the commitment to
gm by ending Σeq during the open phase. In the simulation phase, for simulating
a corrupted committer C, given the secret key of the Paillier encryption, the UC
simulator Sim decrypts the Paillier encryption of m and obtains m. (This satisfies
extractability.) If C is honest, then by utilizing a trapdoor commitment scheme,
the UC simulator Sim first commits to 0 and then simulates Σeq. (This satisfies
equivocability.). Therefore, we reach a DL-extractable UC-commitment scheme.
In the following, we explain a more detailed intuition of the structure of the
6This is parameterized by G and Zp which means G and Zp are hard-coded into the functional-
ity.
7The standard commitment identifier sid shows the case when a committer C commits to a re-
ceiver R within a session.
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DL-extractable UC-commitment scheme Γdl. We first recall the Σ-protocol [59]
in the RPK model.
Σ-protocols [59] in the RPK model. Let R = {x,w} be an NP-relation. A
Σ-protocol Σ = (Σ.P1,Σ.P2,Σ.Vf,Σ.Sim) is a three-round protocol between the
prover P and the verifier V, such that the first and the third messages are by
the prover, and the second message is by the verifier. Let rpkV be the public
key of the verifier. P has input (rpkV;x,w) and V has input (rpkV;x). The first
message is denoted as a ← Σ.P1(rpkV;x,w;s), where s←$ RNDλΣ is sampled
from the randomizer space of the protocol. The second message e is chosen uni-
formly at random from {0,1}λ , e←${0,1}λ . The third message is denoted as
z← Σ.P2(rpkV;x,w;e;s). The verifier accepts iff Σ.Vf(rpkV;x;a,e,z) = 1.
A Σ-protocol is complete for R if a honest verifier always accepts a honest
prover. A Σ-protocol is specially sound for R if given an input x and two accept-
able views (a,e1,z1) and (a,e2,z2), e1 6= e2, one can efficiently extract a witness
w, such that (x,w) ∈R. A Σ-protocol is statistically special honest-verifier zero-
knowledge (SSHVZK) for R if for any rpkV, x and e, Σ.Sim(rpkV;x,e) can first
choose a z and then a, such that the simulated view (a,e,z) and the real view,
given the same e, have negligible statistical distance.
Σ-Protocol Σeq. Assume Pai be the Paillier cryptosystem and SCS be the SCS
cryptosystem. Recall that the plaintext space of SCS is G (of order p) and the
plaintext space of Pai is ZN for an N > p. The modulo N = PQ where P= 2P′+1
and Q = 2Q′+1 are safe primes. (The case N = p is straightforward to handle).
As stated before, the main core of the construction of the DL-extractable UC-
commitment Γdl is the new Σeq-protocol. We utilize Σeq to prove the knowledge
of the discrete logarithm m of the SCS encryption of gm in Fuj construction [80]
instead of its Σ-protocol. Let
Req =

(x = (p,SCS.pkP,Pai.pkP,g
m,c1,c2, lbl),w = (m′,r1,r2)) :
c1 = SCS.Enc
lbl
SCS.pkP
(gm;r1) ∧ c2 = Pai.EncPai.pkP(m′;r2)∧
m≡ m′ (mod p) ∧ m′ < N
 ,
where p← Pgen(1λ ), lbl is a label of the SCS cryptosystem and m′,m ∈ Zp are
the secret values. Here, SCS.Enc(.) and SCS.pk are respectively the encryption
algorithm and the public key of the SCS cryptosystem. Pai.Enc(.) and Pai.pk
are respectively the encryption algorithm and the public key of the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. LetLeq = {x : ∃w,(x,w) ∈Req} be the corresponding language. Thus,
x ∈Leq iff the two ciphertexts c1 and c2 encrypt gm and m′ respectively, such that
m ≡ m′ (mod p). We depict the full of the Σeq-protocol for the relation Req in
Fig. 11. Here, DF.Commit(.) and DF.ck are respectively the commitment algo-
rithm and the public key of the construction of Damgård-Fujisaki [62]. Let T be
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1. Denote RNDλΣeq := Z2B+λ × Zp × {0, . . . ,max(22λ p,T · C(λ ) ·
2λ ) − 1} × Z∗N2 × {0, . . . ,C(λ )2B+2λ − 1}. P samples s :=
(s1,s2,s3,s4,s5)←$ RNDλΣeq.
P sets a˜1← DF.Commit(DF.ckV;m;s1), a2← (gs2 ,hs2 ,(cdτ)s2)>, a3←
gs3 , a4← (1+ s3N)sN4 mod N2, a˜5← g˜s3 h˜s5 .
P sends a← Σeq.P1(rpkV;x,w;s) := (a˜1,a2,a3,a4, a˜5) to V.
2. V sends e←${0,1}λ to P.
3. P sets z1 ← r1e+ s2, z2 ← me+ s3, z3 ← re2s4 mod N2, z4 ← s1e+ s5.
Let z := (z1,z2,z3,z4). P sends Σeq.P2(rpkV;x,w;e;s) := z to V.
4. V outputs 1 iff the following holds (otherwise, V outputs 0):
(a) ce1a2 = (g
z1 ,gemhz1 ,(cdτ)z1)>,
(b) gem ·a3 = gz2 ,
(c) ce2a4 ≡ (1+N)z2zN3 (mod N2),
(d) a˜e1a˜5 = g˜
z2 h˜z4 , and
(e) z2 ∈ {−T ·C(λ ), · · · ,T ·C(λ )(2λ +1)}.
Denote this check by Σeq.Vf(rpkV;x;a,e,z) ∈ {0,1}.
Figure 11. Σ-protocol Σeq forReq.
a public constant such that m < T , e.g. T = p. Let C(λ ) be a function from Z+
to Z+, such that C(λ ) is superpolynomial (C(λ ) = 2λ ). Let 2B be a close upper
bound on the order of the group G˜.8
We note that gm is public while the message m is not; this corresponds to the
use of gm in the new DL-extractable UC-commitment. We remark that in Fig. 11,
in the honest case, c1 =(c11,c12,c13)>← SCS.EnclblSCS.pkP(gm;r1)= (gr1 ,gmhr1 ,(cdτ)r1)>
and c2←Pai.EncPai.pkP(m;r2)= (1+N)mrN2 ≡ (1+mN)rN2 mod N2. Here, r1←$Zp,
τ = H(lbl,c11,c12), and r2←$Z∗N . In Theorem 1 of [7], we prove the security of
Σ-protocol Σeq in Fig. 11.
Construction of DL-extractable UC-commitment. Now we construct a DL-
extractable UC-commitment scheme Γdl based on Fujisaki’s UC-commitment scheme
Fuj [80]. We depict the full construction of Γdl in Fig. 12. As noted before, we
first move Fuj’s setup to the RPK model and so use the public key rpk notation
instead of the CRS crs. We split the public key rpki of Gi ∈ {C,R} into the binding
part (rpkb) and the hiding part (rpkh). More precisely when the party Gi acts as
the receiver R, the corresponding public key rpki contains the binding part. While
rpki contains the hiding part when the party Gi acts as the committer C. Therefor
rpk = (rpkb, rpkh).
8G˜ = U×H is a multiplicative abelian group such that H has order divisible only by large
primes. Notice that if G˜ is the multiplicative group modulo N = PQ where P = 2P′+ 1 and Q =
2Q′+1 are safe primes, then the order of G˜= 4P′Q′ (this setting is often recommended if one uses
the Paillier cryptosystem [125].).
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Then, we utilize SCS public-key cryptosystem [3], the additively homomor-
phic Paillier encryption Pai [125], the pederson commitment Ped, and the sigma-
protocol Σeq during the committing phase Γdl.Commit. In the opening phase
Γdl.Open. we employ the Ped and Σeq schemes. Finally, the extraction can be
done by decrypting the Pai’s ciphertext in the extraction phase Γdl.Ext.
We define the hiding part rpkh=(p,SCS.pk,Pai.pk,Hh)where SCS.pk, Pai.pk,
and Hh are respectively the public key of SCS encryption scheme, the public key
of Pai encryption scheme, and the collision-resistant hash function. The binding
part rpkb = (p,Ped.ck,DF.ck,Hb) where Ped.ck, DF.ck, and Hb are respectively
the public key of Ped commitment scheme, the public key of Damgård-Fujisaki’s
integer commitment DF [62], and the collision-resistant hash function. See Fig. 12
for the full description of the DL-extractable UC-commitment Γdl.
As usual in the RPK model, the algorithm Γdl.Gen of Fig. 12 for party Gi ∈
{C,R} is run by the key registration authority Ri, the algorithms Γdl.Commit
and Γdl.Open are run by the committer C, and the algorithm Γdl.Vf is run by the
receiver R. We remark that the algorithms Γdl.tdOpen and Γdl.Ext are only used
for the security proof of Γdl scheme. Finally, in theorem 2 of [7], we prove the Γdl
scheme from Fig. 12 is a secure DL-extractable UC-commitment scheme in the
RPK model.
67
Γdl.Gen(1λ ) : Generate new keys (SCS.pk,SCS.sk) for SCS, (Pai.pk,Pai.sk) for Pai,
(DF.ck,DF.td) for DF, and (Ped.ck,Ped.td) for Ped. Choose collision-resistant
hash functions Hh,Hb. Let p← Pgen(1λ ). Let rpk = (rpkh, rpkb) where rpkh =
(p,SCS.pk,Pai.pk,Hh) and rpkb = (p,Ped.ck,DF.ck,Hb). Let td = (tdh, tdb),
where tdh = (SCS.sk,Pai.sk) and tdb = (Ped.td,DF.td).
Return (rpk, td). / The equivocability td is Ped.td; The extraction td is Pai.sk;
Γdl.Commit(rpkC; lbl,m) where lbl = (sid,cid,C,R): to commit to m ∈ Zp for R upon
receiving (commit, lbl,m), C does the following.
1. Obtain rpkR = (rpk
h
R, rpk
b
R) fromRR;
ckCR← (rpkhC, rpkbR); Σeq.rpkR← DF.ckR;
r1←$ RNDλSCS; r2←$ RNDλPai;
c1← SCS.EnclblSCS.pkC(gm;r1); c2← Pai.EncPai.pkC(m;r2);
c← (c1,c2);
x← (p,SCS.pkC,Pai.pkC,gm,c, lbl); w← (m,r1,r2);
s←$ RNDλΣeq; a← Σeq.P1(Σeq.rpkR;x,w;s); hx← HbR(lbl,x,a);
(*) r3←$ RNDλPed; c3← Ped.Commit(Ped.ckR;hx;r3);
Send (lbl,c3) to R;
2. After obtaining (lbl,c3), R fetches rpkC = (rpk
h
C, rpk
b
C) from RC, sets
ckCR as above, and checks that c3 is a valid ciphertext. If yes, he sets
e←${0,1}λ and sends (lbl,e) to C. Otherwise, R ignores it.
3. After receiving (lbl,e), C does the following.
z← Σeq.P2(Σeq.rpkR;x,w;e;s);
Securely delete (w = (m,r1,r2),s);
op← (lbl,c3,e;a,z,r3); Store stC = (c,gm,op);
Output (c,op) (privately); Send (com, lbl,c) to R;
4. R checks that c = (c1,c2) ∈ G3×ZN2 . If yes, R outputs (rcpt, lbl), and
stores stR← (lbl,c3,e,c = (c1,c2)). Otherwise, R ignores it.
Γdl.Open(stC): upon receiving (open,sid,cid), C sends (gm,op) to R.
Γdl.Vf(ckCR;c,gm,op) where c = (c1,c2): upon receiving (gm,op =
(lbl,c3,e;a,z,r3)) where lbl = (sid,cid,C,R), R does the following.
1. x← (p,SCS.pkC,Pai.pkC,gm,c, lbl); hx← HbR(lbl,x,a);
2. If cid has not been used with C, (lbl,c3,e) are the same as in the
commit phase, c3 = Ped.Commit(Ped.ckR;hx;r3), and Σeq.Vf(Σeq.rpkR;
x;a,e,z) = 1, then output (open, lbl,gm). Otherwise, ignore the message.
Γdl.tdOpen(rpkC, td
b
R;c,g
m,op,gm
′
) :
x← (p,SCS.pkC,Pai.pkC,gm,c, lbl); x′← (p,SCS.pkC,Pai.pkC,gm
′
,c, lbl);
(a′,z′)← Σeq.Sim(Σeq.rpkR;x′,e);
op′← Ped.tdOpen(Ped.tdR;HbR(lbl,x,a),r3,HbR(lbl,x′,a′));
return op′;
Γdl.Ext(td
h
C;c): return Pai.DecPai.sk(c2) mod p;
Figure 12. The commitment scheme Γdl in the RPK model
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1. Conclusion
In this thesis, we investigate the important issues for the practical use of NIZKs
that are (i) the need of a trusted setup for generating CRS of NIZKs and (ii) adding
universal composability to guarantee that security is preserved if the protocol is
concurrently run with other protocols or even copies of itself.
In the line of these subjects, we present some concrete constructions that pro-
vide the aforementioned properties. For the case (i) and in the line of diminishing
the trust, we show how one can construct a subversion zero-knowledge version
of the most efficient zk-SNARK [94] and the most efficient QA-NIZK [106] con-
structions where the prover does not need to trust the CRS generator. More for-
mally the zero-knowledge property of the constructions remains when the CRS
generator is subverted. In line with the case (ii), in terms of universal compos-
ability issue, we first utilize SPHFs and introduce a new cryptographic primitive
called publicly computable SPHFs (PC-SPHFs) that has a lot of uses in building
cryptography protocols. Then we explicate how one can construct the currently
most efficient non-interactive UC-secure commitment by using labeled CS en-
cryption scheme and PC-SPHF on labeled CS ciphertexts. Finally, we develop
a new technique for constructing a UC-secure commitment scheme called DL-
extractable commitment that that is compatible with MPC approach (enables one
to generate CRS of zk-SNARKs in a UC secure manner).
5.2. Open Questions
In this part, we highlight some open questions left in the research line of the thesis.
I Both subversion constructions of zk-SNARKs and QA-NIZK are built in an
ad-hoc manner. Thus the interesting question left is whether we can design
such construction in a generic way?
II In the line of constructing (generic) UC-secure commitment and in the lattice-
based direction, Katz and Vaikuntanathan [103] constructed the first (approx-
imate) SPHF for a lattice-based language. Later Benhamouda et al. [29]
improved the Katz-Vaikuntanathan construction, where the construction is
over a tag-based IND-CCA encryption scheme a la Micciancio-Peikert [121].
Now an interesting question is if we can construct PC-SPHFs for the class of
lattice-based languages? Then can we construct a post-quantum UC-secure
commitment scheme?
III As stated before the DL-extractable commitment scheme is the first commit-
ment scheme that allows one to open a commitment to a group element gx;
but the UC simulator is able to extract its discrete logarithm x. In fact, our
construction is interactive and so the question left here is whether we can
construct a non-interactive version of it?
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Kinnitusskeemid ja nullteadmustõestused on ühed põhilisemad krüptograafilised
primitiivid, millel on hulgaliselt päriselu rakendusi. Kinnitusskeem võimaldab
osapoolel arvutada salajasest sõnumist kinnitus ja hiljem see avada (avalikusta-
da sõnum) verifitseeritaval viisil. Erilist huvi pakuvad täieliku koosluskindlusega
kinnitusskeemid kuna nende turvalisus säilib isegi kui kinnitusskeem on kombi-
neeritud suvaliste teiste protokollidega. Tõhusad koosluskindlusega kinnitusskee-
mid võimaldavad paremat tõhusust rakendustes nagu kahe osapoole sasiahelad,
nullteadmustõestused ja turvaline ühistöötlus. Kahjuks tüüpiliselt koosluskindluse
nõue tähendab, et kinnitusskeem ei ole niivõrd tõhus kui koosluskindluseta alter-
natiiv. Nullteadmustõestus on protokoll tõestaja ja verifitseerija vahel, mis võimal-
dab tõestajal veenda verifitseerijat mingi väite paikapidavuses ilma rohkema in-
formatsiooni lekitamiseta. Eelkõige just mitteinteraktiivsed nullteadmustõestused
mängivad kriitlist rolli paljudes krüptograafilistes protokollides võimaldades ve-
rifitseerida mingi arvutuse korrektsust ilma, et kasutaja privaatsus oleks rikutud.
Mitteinteraktiivsed nullteadmustõestused leiavad aina enam päriselu kasutust näi-
teks krüptorahades ja muudes hajustalletussüsteemides. Seega on väga oluline, et
sellised tõestused oleks lühikesed ja kiire verifitseeritavusega. Just selliste oma-
dustega on SNARK tüüpi nullteadmustõestused, mis on viimasel ajal olnud to-
hutu huvi all nii teaduses kui ka praktikas. Lisaks sellele on viimasel ajal aktiiv-
selt uuritud kvaasi-adaptiivseid mitteinteraktiivseid nullteadmustõestusi lineaar-
sete keelte jaoks. Nendel süsteemidel on samuti kompaktsed tõestused ja seega pa-
kuvad suurt huvi päris maailmas. Mitteinteraktiivsete nullteadmustõestuste juures
on üks suuremaid praktilisi nõrkusi usaldatud seadistusfaas osapoolte ühisstrin-
gi genereerimiseks. Sellel suunal on välja pakutud kaks peamist praktilist lahen-
dust: (i) Bellare ja teised [22] pakkusid välja õõnestuskindla nullteadmustõestuse
mõiste, kus nullteadmuse omadus säilib ka siis kui ühisstring tuleb pahatahlikult
osapoolelt, (ii) ühisarvutuse kasutamine ühisstringi loomiseks. Teise lahenduse
puhul on koosluskindlus äärmiselt oluline kuna me soovime kombineerida ühis-
arvutuse protokolli nullteadmusprotokolliga. Selles doktoritöös uurime eelmaini-
tud suundi ja pakume välja konkreetsed konstruktsioonid nende realiseerimiseks.
Esiteks uurime õõnestuskindlaid SNARKe ja pakume välja õõnestuskindla ver-
siooni seni kõige tõhusamast SNARKist [94]. Seejärel me uurime õõnestuskind-
laid kvaasi-adaptiivseid tõestusi ja samuti pakume välja õõnestusekindla versiooni
kõige efektiivsemast kvaasi-adaptiivsest nullteadmustõestusest [106]. Teisel suu-
nal me kõigepealt kasutame pidevaid projektiivseid räsifunktsioone ja pakume
välja uue primitiive, kus eelmainitud räsifunktsioonid on avalikult verifitseerita-
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Mitte-interaktiivsedinullteadmusprotokollid
nõorgemateiusalduseeldustega?
vad. Nende abil me konstrueerime seni kõige tõhusama mitteinteraktiivse koos-
luskindla kinnitusskeemi. Lõpetuseks me töötame välja uue võtte koosluskindlate
kinnitusskeemide jaoks, mis võimaldab ühisarvutuse abil luua nullteadmustões-
tuste ühisstringe.
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